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WEBSITE OPERATORS AND MISAPPROPRIATORS BEWARE!
THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT HOLDS A PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION PROHIBITING INTERNET POSTING OF
DVD DECRYPTION SOURCE CODE DOES NOT
VIOLATE THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN
DVD COPY CONTROL ASSOCIATION, INC. V BUNNER
I. INTRODUCTION
A. DVDs, CSS, and the Creation of the DVD CCA
Digital versatile discs ("DVDs") are small discs capable of hold-
ing enough information to display a full-length motion picture
which can be played on a personal DVD player.' DVDs were cre-
ated in the early 1990s to provide higher visual and audio quality in
displaying motion pictures over then existing analog tapes. 2 The
digital format of DVDs allows for the possibility of quick, efficient,
and widespread copying of a disc's contents. 3 Originally, the digital
contents of any given DVD could be quickly copied and easily dis-
tributed to users across the Internet.4 Fearing this risk, movie stu-
1. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 436 (2d Cir. 2001)
("Movies in digital form are placed on disks, known as DVDs, which can be played
on a DVD player (either a stand-alone device or a component of a computer).");
see also Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 307 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (describing size of DVDs), amended by No. 00 Civ. 0277, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12548, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2001).
2. See Corley, 273 F.3d at 436 (noting advantages of DVDs including "improved
visual and audio quality, larger data capacity, and greater durability"); see also
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 307 ("They are the latest technology for private home
viewing of recorded motion pictures and result in drastically improved audio and
visual clarity and quality of motion pictures shown on televisions or computer
screens.").
3. See Corley, 273 F.3d at 436 (describing near perfect copying process); see also
Brian R. Chase, Legal Update, The First Amendment and DeCSS, 8 B.U. J. Sci. &
TECH. L. 729, 729 (2002) (noting "copies of digital media are virtually perfect");
Bonnie L. Schriefer, Comment, "Yelling Fire" and Hacking: Why the First Amendment
Does Not Permit Distributing DVD Decryption Technology, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 2283,
2287 (2003) (noting "easy and inexpensive" method of copying DVDs).
4. See Corley, 273 F.3d at 436 (stating "a virtually perfect copy ... can be readily
made at the click of a computer control and instantly distributed to countless re-
cipients throughout the world over the Internet"). The Internet is "an interna-
tional network of 'interconnected computers' which 'enable [s] tens of millions of
people to communicate with one another and to access vast amounts of informa-
tion from around the world."' Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 58 P.3d 2, 4 (Cal.
2002) (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849-50 (1997)).
(341)
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dios were initially reluctant to release motion pictures for sale to
consumers in the DVD format.5
Before agreeing to release motion pictures in DVD format, the
movie industry "insisted that a viable protection system be made
available to prevent users from making copies of motion pictures in
digital form."6 In mid-1996, Toshiba and Matsushita Electric Indus-
trial Co., Ltd., developed the Content Scramble System ("CSS"), an
encryption technique designed to prevent DVD piracy through ille-
gal copying. 7 The CSS encryption program utilizes an algorithm
configured by master keys to prevent piracy of DVD contents.8
Movie studios adopted CSS encryption technology to prevent
piracy of copyrighted material contained on DVDs, and they estab-
lished a licensing agreement to protect the confidentiality of CSS
technology. 9 In October 1996, the motion picture industry began
licensing the CSS technology and licensees "had to maintain the
confidentiality of propriety information embodied in the CSS tech-
nology, including the 'master keys' and algorithms."10 Under the
licensing agreement, manufacturers of DVD players were given CSS
technology in exchange for an administrative fee and a confidenti-
ality agreement.11 Eventually, the movie industry established the
5. See Corley, 273 F.3d at 436 (noting hesitation among motion picture stu-
dios); see also Chase, supra note 3, at 729 (describing fear of piracy by motion pic-
ture studios).
6. DVD Copy Control Ass'n, Inc. v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 6 (Cal. 2003). The
court in Bunner noted that "[w]ithout such protection, [the movie industry] would
not have agreed to release movies on DVD's." Id.
7. See Corley, 273 F.3d at 436 (noting year of CSS development); see also Bun-
ner, 75 P.3d at 6 (listing companies who developed CSS technology); Schriefer,
supra note 3, at 2287 (describing CSS encryption technique to combat DVD
piracy).
8. See Corley, 273 F.3d at 436 (noting CSS encryption scheme). Essentially,
The algorithm is a type of mathematical formula for transforming the
contents of the movie file into gibberish; the "keys" are in actuality strings
of O's and l's that serve as values for the mathematical formula. Decryp-
tion in the case of CSS requires a set of "player keys" contained in compli-
ant DVD players, as well as an understanding of the CSS encryption
algorithm. Without the player keys and the algorithm, a DVD player can-
not access the contents of a DVD. With the player keys and the al-
gorithm, a DVD player can display the movie on a television or a
computer screen, but does not give a viewer the ability to use the copy
function of the computer to copy the movie or to manipulate the digital
content of the DVD.
Id. at 436-37.
9. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 7 (noting motion picture industry adoption of CSS);
see also Schriefer, supra note 3, at 2288 (noting licensing agreement of CSS technol-
ogy as protective measure).
10. Bunner, 75 P.3d at 7 (describing specifics of licensing agreement).
11. See Corley, 273 F.3d at 437 (stating requirements of licensing agreement).
[Vol. 11: p. 341
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DVD Copy Control Association ("DVD CCA") to manage the licens-
ing of CSS technology.1 2
B. Reverse Engineering and the Creation of DeCSS
Despite the efforts of DVD CCA to prevent the acquisition of
the CSS encryption technology, Jon Johansen, a Norwegian teen-
ager, utilized the process of reverse engineering to acquire the
master keys and algorithms found within CSS. a3 The process of re-
verse engineering "requires an end-user to use a software tool that
reverses the process of software development to yield the source
code. '14 Johansen used the CSS master keys and algorithms ac-
quired through reverse engineering to write a program called
DeCSS.15 The DeCSS program decrypts the CSS encryption pro-
gram found on DVDs, allowing users to copy the contents of the
disc.16 Furthermore, the DeCSS program allows users to play the
encrypted DVDs on a non-licensed DVD player.'
7
12. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 7 (noting establishment of DVD CCA); see also
Chase, supra note 3, at 730 (mentioning DVD CCA's control of CSS technology).
13. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 7 (noting Johansen's acquisition of CSS encryption
technology); see also Chase, supra note 3, at 730 (describing reverse engineering
process used to decrypt CSS); Schriefer, supra note 3, at 2288 (noting discovery of
CSS encryption algorithm).
14. Rod Dixon, Breaking into Locked Rooms to Access Computer Source Code: Does
the DMCA Violate a Constitutional Mandate When Technological Barriers of Access Are
Applied to Software?, 8 VA.J.L. & TECH. 2, 1 29 (last visited Apr. 12, 2004), at http://
www.vjolt.net/vol8/issuel/v8il a02-Dixon.pdf. Dixon described the process of re-
verse engineering, stating "[r]everse engineering, in this manner (often called
decompilation), does not yield an exact copy of the original source code, but it
does reveal at least sub-routines showing the structure and operation of a pro-
gram." Id. Johansen used reverse engineering software created by Xing Technol-
ogy Corporation, which contains a licensing agreement that specifically prohibits
reverse engineering. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 7 (noting Johansen's process for re-
verse engineering CSS).
15. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 7 (noting development of DeCSS through reverse
engineering).
16. See id. at 7 ("Using the proprietary information culled from this software,
Johansen wrote a program called DeCSS that decrypts movies stored on DVD's and
enables users to copy and distribute these movies.").
17. See Schriefer, supra note 3, at 2289 (stating DVDs can "be copied and
played on 'non-compliant' DVD players"); see also DeCSS Source Code That Allegedly
Contained Trade Secrets Was Protected by First Amendment, COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW.,
Jan. 2002, at 26 ("DeCSS consists of computer source code that describes a method
for playing an encrypted DVD on a non-CSS-equipped DVD player or drive.").
Basically,
[i]f a user runs the DeCSS program (for example, by clicking on the
DeCSS icon on a Microsoft operating system platform) with a DVD in the
computer's disk drive, DeCSS will decrypt the DVD's CSS protection, al-
lowing the user to copy the DVD's files and place the copy on the user's
hard drive. The result is a very large computer file that can be played on
3
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In October of 1999, Johansen posted the DeCSS source code
on an Internet website. 18 Soon after Johansen posted the DeCSS
source code on the website, "DeCSS was widely available on the In-
ternet, in both object code and various forms of source code."'19
One such website posting the DeCSS source code was operated by
Andrew Bunner, the defendant in DVD Copy Control Ass'n, Inc. v.
Bunner.20
This Note begins with a summary of the facts and unique pro-
cedural posture of Bunner.2 1 The background section begins by
briefly discussing California's Uniform Trade Secrets Act
("UTSA").22 That section also discusses the underlying framework
for First Amendment free speech analysis of preliminary injunc-
tions.23 The First Amendment section (1) analyzes why computer
codes are offered First Amendment protection; 24 (2) examines va-
rious factors used to determine whether an injunction is content-
based or content-neutral; 25 (3) discusses the specific level of scru-
a non-CSS-compliant player and copied, manipulated, and transferred
just like any other computer file.
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 437-38 (2d Cir. 2001).
18. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 7 (noting date Johansen posted source code on
Internet).
19. Corley, 273 F.3d at 439 (noting wide availability of DeCSS within months of
its appearance onjohansen's website in executable form). The DeCSS technology
was capable of spreading so quickly because "[i]f a Web page is freely accessible,
then anyone with access to a computer connected to the Internet may view that
page." Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 58 P.3d 2, 5 (Cal. 2002). Therefore, "[s]oon
after its initial publication on the Internet, DeCSS appeared on numerous Web
sites throughout the world." DeCSS Source Code That Allegedly Contained Trade Secrets
Was Protected by First Amendment, supra note 17, at 26.
20. See 75 P.3d at 7 (noting Andrew Bunner's posting of DeCSS on website).
21. See id. at 7-9 (noting facts and procedural posture). For a detailed discus-
sion of facts and procedural posture of Bunner, see infra notes 30-49 and accompa-
nying text.
22. See CAL. Civ. CODE tit. 5, §§ 3426.1-2 (Deering 2003) (describing violations
of California's Uniform Trade Secrets Act). For a discussion of the California
UTSA, see infra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
23. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (noting freedom of speech provision); see also
CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 2 (including free speech provision). For a detailed discussion
of First Amendment free speech analysis, see infra notes 58-107 and accompanying
text.
24. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 326-27
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (listing reasons for First Amendment protection of computer
codes), amended by No. 00 Civ. 0277, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12548, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 17, 2001); see also Corley, 273 F.3d at 445-49 (noting computer codes are of-
fered First Amendment scrutiny); Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 484-85 (6th Cir.
2000) (explaining why computer codes are offered First Amendment protection).
For a detailed discussion of why computer codes are examined under First Amend-
ment scrutiny, see infra notes 58-76 and accompanying text.
25. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 763-66 (1994) (dis-
cussing factors applied to determine content-neutrality); see also Ward v. Rock
4
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tiny applied to content-neutral injunctions;26 and (4) reviews the
prior restraint limitations on preliminary injunctions under the
First Amendment.27
Next, this Note analyzes the California Supreme Court's rea-
soning in Bunner, concentrating on First Amendment free speech
analysis, the limitation of the holding, and the concurrence of Jus-
ice Moreno discussing the court's decision to remand. 28 Finally,
this Note discusses the impact of the Bunner decision on both First
Amendment analysis and technology in corporate America. 29
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF BUNNER
Andrew Bunner claimed that he posted DeCSS on his website
because "it would enable 'Linux' users to use and enjoy 'DVDs'
available for purchase or rental in video stores and make 'Linux'
more attractive and viable to customers."30 After discovering that
the DeCSS program was widely available on the Internet, DVD CCA
and the Motion Picture Association ("MPA") searched for websites
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). For a discussion of the various factors
used to determine if an injunction is content-based or content-neutral, see infta
notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
26. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (noting content-neutral balancing test); see also
Madsen, 512 U.S. at 765 (discussing content-neutral balancing test); S.F. Arts &
Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 537 n.16 (1987)
(noting content-neutral balancing test). For a discussion of the balancing test ap-
plied to content-neutral injunctions, see infra notes 85-97 and accompanying text.
27. See Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) (defining prior
restraint); see also Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 322-23 (2002) (limiting
prior restraint restriction to content-based injunctions); Madsen, 512 U.S. at 763-64
n.2 (noting not all content-neutral injunctions are prior restraints). For a detailed
discussion of the prior restraint limitations imposed under a First Amendment
analysis, see infra notes 98-107 and accompanying text.
28. See DVD Copy Control Ass'n, Inc. v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 10-20 (Cal. 2003)
(discussing court's legal analysis of free speech implications presented by Bunner's
website). For a detailed discussion of the California Supreme Court's legal analysis
in Bunner, see infra notes 108-206 and accompanying text.
29. See Cal. High Court Tackles Secrets, First Amendment Issues on DeCSS, WASH.
INTERNET DAILY, May 30, 2003, at 1 (discussing potential impact of Bunner decision
on various industries); see also California; DVD Group Seeks Reversal of Ruling on Decod-
ing Tool; Industry Argues Posting of Decryption Program Should Not Be Protected by the 1st
Amendment, L.A. TIMES, May 30, 2003, § 3 (Business), at 2 (noting amount of DVD
sales lost to piracy); Mike McKee, Triends'in High Places; In a Sign of What's at Stake,
California Justices Deluged with 42 Amicus Briefs in Trade Secrets Dispute, MIAMi DAILY
Bus. Rav., Aug. 30, 2002, at Al0 (noting number of amicus briefs filed on behalf of
corporate America). For a discussion of the impact of the Bunner decision, see
infra notes 207-24 and accompanying text.
30. Bunner, 75 P.3d at 7. The court noted that "Bunner also claimed he
wanted 'to ensure [that] programmers would have access to information needed
to add new features, fix existing defects and, in general, improve the '[D]eCSS'
program."' Id. (alterations in original).
5
Washburn: Website Operators and Misappropriators Beware - The California Su
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2004
346 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
which disclosed CSS technology or linked users to other websites
containing the same information.31 Following this search, MPA
sent notice to Internet service providers and operators of websites
which contained or linked viewers to sites containing the DeCSS
program, demanding the removal of the information. 32 Despite
MPA's demands, Bunner and numerous other website operators re-
fused to remove the DeCSS source code.33
As a result, DVD CCA filed an action in the California Superior
Court, Santa Clara County, against Bunner and "numerous other
named and unnamed individuals who had published or linked to
Web sites publishing DeCSS (collectively defendants), alleging
trade secret misappropriation." 34 DVD CCA did not seek damages
from the website operators; it simply sought a preliminary injunc-
tion. 3  DVD CCA also filed an ex parte application seeking a tempo-
rary restraining order ("TRO").36 The trial court denied the TRO
but issued an order to show cause "why the injunction and re-
31. See id. at 7-8 ("Upon discovering the posting of DeCSS on the Internet,
DVD CCA and [MPA] made extensive efforts to identify those Web sites disclosing
proprietary CSS technology or linking to sites posting this information.").
32. See id. at 8 (discussing MPA's demand for removal of DeCSS from web-
sites); see also DVD CCA and Web Site Operator Both Claim Wins in Cal. Case, WASH.
INTERNET DAILY, Aug. 26, 2003, at 1 (noting MPA requested that Bunner take down
website).
33. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 8 (noting Bunner's refusal to remove DeCSS source
code posted on his site); see also DVD CCA and Web Site Operator Both Claim Wins in
Cal. Case, supra note 32, at 1 (noting Bunner's refusal to remove DeCSS source
code from his website).
But see Bunner, 75 P.3d at 8 n.4 (noting that "following the filing of this action,
Bunner apparently removed the DeCSS from his Web site").
34. Bunner, 75 P.3d at 8; see also Calif High Court Asked to Review DVD Decryption
Code Case, COMPUTER & ONLINE INDUSTRY LITIG. REP., Jan. 15, 2002, at 3 (noting
suit filed in California Superior Court, Santa Clara County). DVD CCA alleged
trade secret misappropriate in violation of the California UTSA, CAL. CiV. CODE tit.
5, §§ 3426.1-2 (Deering 2003). See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 8-9 (noting DVD CCA filed
suit under California UTSA). For a detailed discussion of trade secret misappro-
priation under the California UTSA, see infra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
35. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 8 (noting DVD CCA's request for injunctive relief).
DVD CCA sought an order:
enjoining and restraining [d]efendants. .. from making any further use
or otherwise disclosing or distributing, on their web sites or elsewhere, or
'linking' to other web sites which disclose, distribute, or 'link' to any pro-
prietary property or trade secrets relating to the CSS technology and spe-
cifically enjoining [d]efendants ... from copying, duplicating, licensing,
selling, distributing, publishing, leasing, renting or otherwise marketing
the DeCSS computer program and all other products containing, using
and/or substantially derived from CSS proprietary property or trade
secrets ....
Id. (quoting DVD CCA's complaint) (alterations in original).
36. See id. ("Soon after filing the complaint, DVD CCA filed an ex parte appli-
cation for a temporary restraining order (TRO).").
[Vol. 11: p. 341
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straints sought in [DVD CCA's] proposed preliminary injunction
should not be entered against defendants... ."37 Following a hear-
ing, the trial court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining Bun-
ner and other defendants from "[p]osting or otherwise disclosing
or distributing, on their [W]eb sites or elsewhere, the DeCSS pro-
gram, the master keys or algorithms of the Content Scrambling Sys-
tem .... or any other information derived from this proprietary
information. ' 38
Most importantly, in issuing the injunction, the trial court as-
sumed that DVD CCA was likely to prevail on the merits under the
California UTSA.3 9 First, the trial court concluded that CSS in fact
contained protectable trade secrets under the California UTSA.40
Second, the trial court noted that Johansen initially acquired the
trade secrets by improper means through reverse engineering.41
Third, the trial court concluded that Bunner and the other website
operators knew or should have known the CSS trade secrets were
acquired by improper means.42 Fourth, the trial court noted that
the "trade secret status of the CSS technology had not been de-
stroyed because it had been posted on the Internet.143 Fifth, the
court concluded that DVD CCA would "suffer irreparable harm
without an injunction" because the CSS technology would lose its
value as a trade secret by continuing to be widely available across
37. Id. (noting order to show cause) (alterations in original).
38. Id. (discussing preliminary injunction) (alterations in original). The
court did refuse "to enjoin the defendants from 'linking to other [websites] which
contain the protected materials' because 'such an order [would be] overbroad and
extremely burdensome.'" Id. (alterations in original).
39. See id. ("In issuing the injunction, the court concluded that DVD CCA was
likely to prevail on the merits and would suffer irreparable harm without injunctive
relief."); see also DVD CCA and Web Site Operator Both Claim Wins in Cal. Case, supra
note 32, at 1 (noting trial court concluded DVD CCA was likely to prevail on
merits).
40. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 8 (explaining that CSS contained protectable trade
secrets because "it derived independent economic value from its secrecy and be-
cause DVD CCA made reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy").
41. See id. (noting reverse engineering was in violation of licensing
agreement).
42. See id. (stating Bunner knew or should have known DeCSS was created
through improper means at time he posted DeCSS on website).
43. Id. (noting CSS remained secret despite Internet posting). Bunner con-
sistently argued, however, that the DeCSS technology was no longer a trade secret
because it was widely available on the Internet. See Calif. Supreme Court Hears Argu-
ments in DVD Decryption Case, TELECOMM. INDUSTRY LITIG. REP., June 17, 2003, at 11
("Bunner had no special access to the asserted trade secret; it was equally accessi-
ble to millions of people around the world. As regrettable as it may be, the trade
secret is no longer secret.").
7
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the Internet. 44 Finally, although the trial court admitted potential
enforcement problems, the court held that the preliminary injunc-
tion would cause little harm to defendant website operators.
45
Bunner was the only original litigant to appeal the trial court's
preliminary injunction, and the San Jose court of appeal subse-
quently reversed. 46 The court of appeal agreed with the trial court
in assuming that DVD CCA was likely to prevail on the merits under
the California UTSA.47 However, the court of appeal held that the
injunction violated the First Amendment regardless of whether it
was justified under the California UTSA because it was a prior re-
straint on pure speech that was significantly outweighed by the gov-
ernmental interests in protecting freedom of speech. 48 DVD CCA
subsequently appealed that decision to the California Supreme
Court.
49
44. Bunner, 75 P.3d at 8. "'If the Court does not immediately enjoin the post-
ing of this proprietary information, [DVD CCA's] right to protect this information
as secret will surely be lost ....' See id. (quoting trial court's conclusion) (altera-
tions in original).
45. See id. ("'[A] possibility or even a likelihood that an order may be dis-
obeyed or not enforced in other jurisdictions is not a reason to deny the relief
sought."') (quoting trial court's holding, despite its acknowledgment of potential
enforcement problems).
46. See id. (noting Bunner's appeal); see also Mike McKee, Calif. Justices to Hear
Case of Free Speech v. Trade Secrets Laws, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 22, 2002, at 4
(reporting San Jose Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District ruling First Amend-
ment trumps California Uniform Trade Secrets Act).
47. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 8 ("[T]he Court of Appeal assumed that DVD CCA
was likely to prevail on the merits and would suffer irreparable harm.").
48. See id. at 8-9 (holding preliminary injunction violated First Amendment).
The court explained,
DVD-CCA's statutory right to protect its economically valuable trade se-
cret is not an interest that is 'more fundamental' than the First Amend-
ment right to freedom of speech or even on equal footing with the
national security interests and other vital governmental interests that
have previously been found insufficient to justify a prior restraint.
Paul Sweeting, Studios Suffer Setback on DeCSS; Court: DVD Cracking Program Is Pro-
tected Speech, VIDEO Bus., Nov. 5, 2001, at 3.
Commentators noted that the court of appeal's reversal was a "significant set-
back for the studios and DVD-CCA, who hoped to use California's strict trade se-
cret laws to protect CSS as well as any future encryption system the studios may use,
such as on next-generation high-definition DVDs." Paul Sweeting, Ruling Expected
on DVD Hack Attack, DAILY VARIETY, June 2, 2003, at 10. Jeffrey Kessler, a partner in
the firm representing DVD CCA, stated that "the ruling makes it impossible for
companies to prevent the theft of trade secrets." Shannon Lafferty, First Amend-
ment Block; No Trade Secret Protection for DVD Encryption Code, ENT. L. & FIN., Nov.
2001, at 4 ("The whole point of the UTSA is if you have a trade secret and some-
one steals [it], you can get an injunction and prevent it from being spread ...
[b]ecause once it's spread, it has no value.").
49. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 9 (granting certiorari to review court of appeal deci-
sion). DVD CCA claimed that the court of appeal's decision "applies the First
Amendment in a blunderbuss manner wholly inconsistent with governing author-
[Vol. 11: p. 341
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. California Uniform Trade Secrets Act
California adopted the UTSA in 1984 to protect trade secrets
from piracy through misappropriation. 50 The California UTSA
provides that a trade secret is some variation of information that
derives its economic value to the holder directly from its secrecy. 51
The holder must maintain reasonable efforts to keep the trade se-
cret from being disclosed. 52 The California UTSA also provides an
elaborate checklist to determine which actions constitute misappro-
priation, including acquisition of another person's trade secrets by
improper means or disclosure of another person's trade secrets
ity and the decisions of numerous courts." Calif. High Court Will Review DVD Declyp-
tion Code Case, SOFrwARE L. BULL., Mar. 2002, at 10. Further, DVD CCA claimed:
[i] n holding the preliminary injunctive relief provisions of the California
UTSA unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this case, the Court of
Appeal effectively repealed the statutory protections afforded to trade
secrets under California law, leaving Petitioner and other trade secret
owners with no meaningful remedy to address the misappropriation and
dissemination of sensitive technology that is the lifeblood of their
businesses.
Id.
50. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 9 ("California had adopted without significant
change the Uniform Trade Secrets Act."); see also Schriefer, supra note 3, at 2291
(noting year California adopted UTSA).
The UTSA has been adopted by approximately forty states in various forms.
See Chase, supra note 3, at 731 (citing ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 34 (2d ed. 2000)).
51. CAL. Ctv. CODE tit. 5, § 3426.1(d) (Deering 2003) (defining trade secret).
Section 3426.1(d) defines a trade secret as:
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device,
method, technique, or process, that:
(1) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from
not being generally known to the public or to other persons who can
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and
(2) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circum-
stances to maintain its secrecy.
Id. Another useful explanation of trade secrets provides:
There are some business formulae, compiled information, and devices or
processes which, though neither copyrighted nor patented, or not even
novel, are kept as trade secrets of the user. They cannot be classified with
any particularity, but any secret information used in the conduct of the
plaintiffs business which is of some competitive advantage to him, and
which is not disclosed to the public, might be included.
BERNARD E. WITKIN, 11 WITKIN SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW EQUITY § 103 (9th ed.
2003).
52. See § 3426.1(d) (2) (noting requirement that information is subject of ef-
fort to maintain its secrecy). But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 39 (1995) (omitting effort requirement for trade secrets). The Restatement de-
fines a trade secret as "any information that can be used in the operation of a
business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an
actual or potential economic advantage over others." Id.
9
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without consent. 3 In addition, the California UTSA states that im-
proper means include forms of theft and bribery implemented
through electronic or other means in breach of a duty to maintain
secrecy.54 The California UTSA notes, however, that reverse engi-
neering alone does not necessarily constitute improper means. 5
5
The California UTSA also contains a provision offering injunc-
tive relief against either actual or threatened misappropriation. 56
Under the UTSA, such an injunction will terminate when the pro-
tected trade secret is no longer in existence.5 7
B. First Amendment Free Speech Analysis Framework
1. Computer Codes and Programs as "Speech"
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution pro-
hibits Congress from making laws that prohibit protected forms of
speech. 58 The California Constitution incorporates a similar provi-
53. See § 3426.1(b) (defining misappropriation). Section 3426.1(b) defines
misappropriation as:
(1) Acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows
or has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper
means; or
(2) Disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or
implied consent by a person who:
(A) Used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret;
or
(B) At the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that
his or her knowledge of the trade secret was: .
(i) Derived from or through a person who had utilized improper
means to acquire it;
(ii) Acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain
its secrecy or limit its use; or
(iii) Derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the per-
son seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or
(C) Before a material change of his or her position, knew or had
reason to know that it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it had
been acquired by accident or mistake.
Id.
54. See § 3426.1 (a) ("'Improper means' includes theft, bribery, misrepresen-
tation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espio-
nage through electronic or other means.").
55. See id. (providing " [r] everse engineering or independent derivation alone
shall not be considered improper means").
56. See CAL. CIv. CODE tit. 5, § 3426.2(a) (Deering 2003) (noting availability of
injunctive relief for actual or threatened misappropriation).
57. See id. ("Upon application to the court, an injunction shall be terminated
when the trade secret has ceased to exist, but the injunction may be continued for
an additional period of time in order to eliminate commercial advantage that oth-
erwise would be derived from the misappropriation.").
58. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (providing free speech rights). The First
Amendment states "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech .... ." Id.
[Vol. 11: p. 341
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sion upholding freedom of speech. 59 Therefore, the starting point
for First Amendment free speech analysis is a determination of
whether the form of expression at issue is indeed protected
speech. 60 Basically, "to say that a particular form of expression is
'protected' by the First Amendment means that the constitutional-
ity of any regulation of it must be measured by reference to the First
Amendment."' 61 Determining whether computer source codes and
programs constitute protected speech is a difficult task because they
serve both expressive and functional purposes.62
In Junger v. Daley,63 the Sixth Circuit noted that "all ideas hav-
ing even the slightest redeeming social importance[, including
those concerning] the advancement of truth, science, morality, and
arts have the full protection of the First Amendment. '64 First
Amendment protection is not limited to "purely expressive commu-
59. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2 ("Every person may freely speak, write and pub-
lish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this
right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press.").
60. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 325-26
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting process of determining protected speech), amended by No.
00 Civ. 0277, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12548, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2001).
61. Id. at 326 (explaining meaning of "protected").
62. SeeJunger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 484-85 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting expres-
sive and functional features of source codes). The court in Junger explained the
dual nature of computer source codes as both expressive and functional, stating:
[I]t is possible to use encryption source code to represent and convey
information and ideas about cryptography[,] and . . .encryption source
code can be used by programmers and scholars for such informational
purposes. Much like a mathematical or scientific formula, one can de-
scribe the function and design of encryption software by a prose explana-
tion; however, for individuals fluent in computer programming language,
source code is the most efficient and precise means by which to commu-
nicate ideas about cryptography.
Id.
63. Id. In Junger, the plaintiff was a professor at the Case Western School of
Law who wanted to post an encryption source code he wrote on a website for his
computers and the law course. See id. at 483 (noting facts of case). For purposes of
national security, most encryption software in electronic form is subject to export
licensing requirements and regulation under Export Control Classification Num-
ber 5D002. See id. (noting facts of case). After applying for the appropriate export
classifications, the Commerce Department found that the encryption software con-
tained in the plaintiffs textbook could not be exported on the website. See id. at
484 (noting Commerce Department's decision). The plaintiff sued, claiming that
the regulations were facially invalid under the First Amendment. See id. (noting
procedure of case). While the trial court held that encryption source codes are
not protected under the First Amendment, the court in Junger held that software
was expressive speech under First Amendment scrutiny. See id. at 485 (setting forth
holding of case).
64. Id. at 484 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
11
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nication. '' 65 Furthermore, although computer source codes are
highly complicated and only understood by a small number of peo-
ple, fundamentally they are an expression of ideas. 66 In Universal
City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes,67 the U.S. District Court for the South-
ern District of New York explained that "[a] 11 modes by which ideas
may be expressed or, perhaps, emotions evoked - including
speech, books, movies, art, and music - are within the area of First
Amendment concern. 68 In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley,
69
the Second Circuit explained that "the ease with which a work is
comprehended is irrelevant to the constitutional inquiry."70 The
65. Id. ("The Supreme Court has recognized First Amendment protection for
symbolic conduct, such as draft-card burning, that has both functional and expres-
sive features.").
66. See id. ("[C]omputer source code, though unintelligible to many, is the
preferred method of communication among computer programmers.").
67. 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), amended by 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12548, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2001). Similar to the factual pattern in Bunner, the
defendants in Reimerdes posted DeCSS technology on their websites and were sub-
sequently sued by the movie industry. See id. at 303 (recalling facts of case). The
plaintiffs in Reimerdes sought an injunction under the Digital Millennium Copy-
right Act ("DMCA") in federal district court. See id. (noting case's procedural pos-
ture). The DMCA is a federal law which allows copyright holders to "create
technological measures on DVDs which will prevent consumers from copying the
information on the DVDs onto their computers and other devices." Chase, supra
note 3, at 732 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000)). The DMCA does not "itself protect
copyrighted materials but instead it protects the technological means copyright
holders use to protect their materials." Id. at 733 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000)).
The court in Reimerdes held that "the antitrafficking provision of the DMCA as
applied to the posting of computer code that circumvents measures that control
access to copyrighted works in digital form is a valid exercise of Congress' author-
ity." Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 332-33.
68. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d. at 327 (noting expressions protected under
First Amendment). Discussing the formation of source codes as expressions of
ideas, the court explained:
The path from idea to human language to source code to object code is a
continuum. As one moves from one to the other, the levels of precision
and, arguably, abstraction increase, as does the level of training necessary
to discern the idea from the expression. Not everyone can understand
each of these forms. Only English speakers will understand English for-
mulations. Principally those familiar with the particular programming
language will understand the source code expression. And only a rela-
tively small number of skilled programmers and computer scientists will
understand the machine readable object code. But each form expresses
the same idea, albeit in different ways.
Id. at 326.
69. 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). The plaintiff in Corley posted a copy of
DeCSS on the Internet and was subsequently sued by eight movie studios seeking
an injunction under the DMCA. See id. at 435-36 (stating facts of case). The Corley
court eventually held that the injunction issued under the DMCA prohibiting the
defendant's posting of DeCSS was valid under the First Amendment. See id. at 455
(providing court's holding).
70. Id. at 445-46. The court noted that "[c]ommunication does not lose con-
stitutional protection as 'speech' simply because it is expressed in the language of
12
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courts in Junger, Reimerdes, and Corley all held that computer source
codes are "protected speech" under the First Amendment because
they are forms of human expression. 71
In addition, Corley held that computer programs are speech
which warrant First Amendment protection. 72 Corley explained that
although computer programs are essentially a set of instructions
that run on a computer terminal, they are still capable of conveying
information.7 3 This conveyance of information by computer pro-
grams is precisely what constitutes protected speech under the First
Amendment.74 As the Corley court noted, "[e]ven dry information,
devoid of advocacy, political relevance, or artistic expression, has
been accorded First Amendment protection. '75 Even assuming that
computer source codes and programs are protected speech under
the First Amendment, it is still necessary to determine what level of
scrutiny should apply in free speech analysis.76
computer code... [i]f computer code is distinguishable from conventional speech
for First Amendment purposes, it is not because it is written in an obscure lan-
guage." Id.
71. SeeJunger, 209 F.3d at 485 ("Because computer source code is an expres-
sive means for the exchange of information and ideas about computer program-
ming, we hold that it is protected by the First Amendment."); see also Corley, 273
F.3d at 449 (holding computer source codes merit First Amendment protection);
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 327 ("As computer code - whether source or object
- is a means of expressing ideas, the First Amendment must be considered before
its dissemination may be prohibited or regulated.").
72. See Corley, 273 F.3d at 449 (holding computer programs derived from
source code merit First Amendment protection).
73. See id. at 447 (noting capacity of computer programs to convey
information).
74. See id. ("But the fact that a program has the capacity to direct the func-
tioning of a computer does not mean that it lacks the additional capacity to convey
information, and it is the conveying of information that renders the instructions
,speech' for purposes of the First Amendment.").
75. Id. at 446. The court further qualified its statements, explaining:
[o]f course, we do not mean to suggest that the communication of"infor-
mation" is a prerequisite of protected "speech." Protected speech may
communicate, among other things, ideas, emotions, or thoughts. We
identify "information" only because this is what computer programs most
often communicate, in addition to giving directions to a computer.
Id. at 447-48 n.19.
76. See Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d. at 327 (noting conclusion that computer
code is protected by First Amendment "still leaves for determination the level of
scrutiny to be applied in determining the constitutionality of regulation of com-
puter code").
13
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2. Determining Content Neutrality
In Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.,77 the Supreme Court
noted that in First Amendment free speech analysis, the first step in
determining the correct level of scrutiny is a determination of
whether the questioned injunction is content-based or content-neu-
tral.78 Content-based injunctions receive heightened scrutiny,
whereas content-neutral injunctions are subject to a lower level of
scrutiny under the First Amendment. 79 In Ward v. Rock Against Ra-
cism,8 0 the Supreme Court explained that "[t]he principle inquiry
in determining content neutrality, in speech cases generally and in
time, place, or manner cases in particular, is whether the govern-
ment has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement
with the message it conveys."81 According to the Court in Ward, the
government's purpose in enforcing a regulation is the "controlling
77. 512 U.S. 753 (1994). The petitioners in Madsen claimed that a Florida
state court injunction creating a thirty-six foot buffer zone for protestors on a pub-
lic street surrounding an abortion clinic violated the First Amendment. See id. at
757 (restating petitioners' claims). The injunction not only prohibited protestors
from "blocking or interfering with public access to the clinic, and from physically
abusing persons entering or leaving the clinic," but also enjoined protestors from
singing, chanting, or making noise within hearing distance from the clinic during
business hours and/or approaching within 300 feet of persons seeking the services
of the clinic or residences of the clinic's employees. Id. at 759-61 (reviewing terms
of the injunction). The Court upheld the buffer zone and noise restrictions but
held that the 300-foot limitation on approaching clinic patrons and the residences
of clinic employees violated the First Amendment. See id. at 776 ("[W]e uphold
the noise restrictions and the 36-foot buffer zone around the clinic entrances and
driveway because they burden no more speech than necessary to eliminate the
unlawful conduct targeted by the state court's injunction.").
78. See id. at 762-65 (discussing various standards of First Amendment
scrutiny).
79. See id. at 763-66 (noting two levels of scrutiny). The Court explained that
content-based injunctions are subject to the heightened level of scrutiny set forth
in Perry Education Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n. See id. at 763-64 (citing Perry,
460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)). For further discussion of the level of scrutiny applicable
to content-neutral injunctions, see infra notes 85-97 and accompanying text.
80. 491 U.S. 781 (1989). The issue in Ward dealt with New York City's "at-
tempt to regulate the volume of amplified music at the bandshell [in Central Park]
so the performances are satisfactory to the audience without intruding upon those
who use the Sheep Meadow or live on Central Park West and in its vicinity." Id. at
784 (examining constitutional issue). New York City established a set of guidelines
for use of the bandshell, and the plaintiffs in Ward sought to declare the guidelines
facially invalid under the First Amendment. Id. at 785-89 (noting plaintiffs sought
declaratory judgment that guidelines were impermissible). The Court in Ward
held that the guidelines were facially valid and did not violate the First Amend-
ment. Id. at 803 (upholding New York City's guidelines).
81. Id. at 791 (determining purpose of regulation is controlling factor) (citing
Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295 (1984)).
[Vol. 11: p. 341
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question" in determining content neutrality.8 2 Madsen later incor-
porated the standards set forth in Ward, explaining that "[o]ur
principle inquiry in determining content neutrality is whether the
government has adopted a regulation of speech 'without reference
to the content of the regulated speech."83 Furthermore, a regula-
tion's incidental effects upon particular viewpoints or speech does
not render the regulation content-based so long as its underlying
purpose is deemed neutral.84
3. The Content-Neutral Government Interest Test
Content-neutral regulations are subject to an intermediate
level of scrutiny under the First Amendment.8 5 In Ward, the Su-
preme Court developed a specific test for content-neutral regula-
tory statutes based on the time, place, or manner of speech. 86 The
Ward Court held that time, place, or manner statutory restrictions
are valid, "provided the restrictions 'are justified without reference
to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tai-
lored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they
leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the
information.' ",87
In Madsen, the Supreme Court adopted a similar test for con-
tent-neutral injunctions which required a determination of
"whether the challenged provisions of the injunction burden no
more speech than necessary to serve a significant government inter-
est."88 In establishing this test, the Court relied on the principle
82. Id. (stating "[t]he government's purpose is the controlling considera-
tion").
83. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 763 (citing Court's analysis in Ward). The Court in
Ward stated "[g]overnment regulation of expressive activity is content neutral so
long as it is 'justified without reference to the content of regulated speech."' Ward,
491 U.S. at 791.
84. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 ("A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to
the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on
some speakers or messages but not others.").
85. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 764-66 (noting lower level of scrutiny applies to
content-neutral regulations).
86. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (noting general test for content-neutral regula-
tions); see also Madsen, 512 U.S. at 764 (noting Ward test applicable to "content-
neutral, generally applicable statute, instead of an injunctive order").
87. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence,
468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)) (declaring government can restrict time, place, and
manner of speech as long as restriction is reasonable).
88. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 765. The Court in Madsen held that the Ward test was
not applicable to content-neutral injunctions, and stated "our standard time, place,
and manner analysis is not sufficiently rigorous." Id. The Court also noted that
"[i] njunctions, of course, have some advantages over generally applicable statutes
15
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that a valid injunction should not be broader than necessary to
serve its purpose.89 In San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United
States Olympic Committee,90 the Supreme Court noted that "[t] he ap-
propriate inquiry is thus whether the incidental restrictions on First
Amendment freedoms are greater than necessary to further a sub-
stantial governmental interest."91 Thus, content-neutral injunc-
tions "will be upheld if they serve a substantial governmental
interest and restrict First Amendment freedoms no more than
necessary." 92
In San Francisco Arts & Athletics, the Supreme Court held that
the protection of a property right is a legitimate governmental in-
terest under the First Amendment.93 Furthermore, "trade secrets
have been recognized as a constitutionally protected intangible
property interest. '94 The property right inherent in trade secrets is
in that they can be tailored by a trial judge to afford more precise relief than a
statute where a violation of the law has already occurred." Id.
89. See id. (noting injunctions should be narrowly tailored to achieve goals).
In Madsen, the Court explained:
Our close attention to the fit between the objectives of an injunction and
the restrictions it imposes on speech is consistent with the general rule,
quite apart from First Amendment considerations, "that injunctive relief
should be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to pro-
vide complete relief to the plaintiffs."
Id. (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979)).
90. 483 U.S. 522 (1987). The San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. ("SFAA")
was promoting the "Gay Olympic Games" which were supposed to rival the tradi-
tional Olympic games with nine days of sporting events. See id. at 525 (restating
facts of case). The SFAA used the term "Olympic" in mailings, advertisements, and
letterhead to promote the event. See id. (noting facts of case). Section 110 of the
Amateur Sports Act, 32 U.S.C. § 380 (1978), grants the United States Olympic
Committee ("USOC") the right to prohibit certain commercial uses of the term
"Olympic." See id. at 526 (noting provisions of Amateur Sports Act). The USOC
sought a preliminary injunction prohibiting the SFAA from using the term
"Olympic" in promoting its event. See id. at 527 (noting procedure of case). The
Supreme Court held that the injunction and the Amateur Sports Act did not vio-
late the First Amendment because they are "not broader than necessary to protect
the legitimate congressional interest." Id. at 540.
91. 483 U.S. at 536-37 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377
(1968)). The Court explained that the appropriate test for content-neutral injunc-
tions requires "a balance between the governmental interest and the magnitude of
the speech restriction." Id. at 537 n.16.
92. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 327-28
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (contrasting content-neutral restrictions with content-based re-
strictions), amended by No. 00 Civ. 0277, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12548, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2001).
93. See 483 U.S. at 540 (holding statute protecting USOC's use of term
"Olympic" is "not broader than necessary to protect the legitimate congressional
interest").
94. ITT Telecom Prods. Corp. v. Dooley, 262 Cal. Rptr. 773, 780 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1989) (concluding trade secrets constitutionally protected absent fraudulent
acts).
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"defined by the extent to which the owner of the secret protects his
interest from disclosure to others. '95 Trade secret law serves legiti-
mate governmental interests such as encouraging the development
of technology and maintaining standards of commercial ethics.
96
95. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984). In Ruckelshaus, the
Court explained that "[i] f an individual discloses his trade secret to others who are
under no obligation to protect the confidentiality of the information, or otherwise
publicly discloses the secret, his property right is extinguished." Id.
96. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481-82, 485-86, 493
(1974) (stating trade secret law promotes commercial ethics and scientific ad-
vancements). The Court in Kewanee explained that "[tihe maintenance of stan-
dards of commercial ethics and the encouragement of invention are the broadly
stated policies behind trade secret law." Id. at 481. The Court further discussed
the harmful chain-reaction effect that a lack of trade secret protection might have
on technological and scientific advancements:
Security precautions necessarily would be increased, and salaries and
fringe benefits of those few officers or employees who had to know the
whole of the secret invention would be fixed in an amount thought suffi-
cient to assure their loyalty. Smaller companies would be placed at a dis-
tinct economic disadvantage, since the costs of this kind of self-help could
be great, and the cost to the public of the use of this invention would be
increased. The innovative entrepreneur with limited resources would
tend to confine his research efforts to himself and those few he felt he
could trust without the ultimate assurance of legal protection against
breaches of confidence. As a result, organized scientific and technologi-
cal research could become fragmented, and society, as a whole, would
suffer.
Id. at 486 (footnotes omitted). With respect to the maintenance of commercial
ethics, the Court in Kewanee explained that "'[t]he necessity of good faith and
honest, fair dealing, is the very life and spirit of the commercial world.'" Id. at 481-
82 (quoting Nat'l Tube Co. v. Eastern Tube Co., 1902 WL 874 at *2 (5th Cir.
1902)).
Despite the efforts of the Supreme Court to uphold standards of commercial
ethics, the Court has held that governmental limitations on speech where the
speaker knows or has reason to know that the information was illegally obtained
violate the First Amendment. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 535 (2001)
("We think it clear that parallel reasoning requires the conclusion that a stranger's
illegal conduct does not suffice to remove the First Amendment shield from
speech about a matter of public concern.") (footnote omitted). In Bartnicki, the
plaintiff was engaged as chief negotiator in a collective bargaining negotiation be-
tween a school teachers' union and the school board. See id. at 518 (stating facts of
case). A cell phone conversation between the plaintiff and the president of the
local union concerning the status of negotiations was subsequently intercepted
and recorded. See id. (recalling facts of case). After members of the local media
aired the contents of the intercepted tape, the plaintiff sought damages under 18
U.S.C. § 2511, which makes it illegal to publicly disclose the contents of inter-
cepted phone conversations. See id. at 520-21 n.3-4 (describing violations of
statute).
The Supreme Court ultimately held that the information intercepted was a
matter of public concern debated in a public forum, and thus, its disclosure was
protected by the First Amendment. See id. at 535 (noting holding of case). The
Court, however, limited the holding to matters of public concern, specifically not-
ing "[w]e need not decide whether that interest is strong enough to justify the
application of § 2511 (c) to disclosures of trade secrets or domestic gossip or other
information of purely private concern." Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 533. For a detailed
357
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Therefore, the protection of trade secrets is the protection of a le-
gitimate property interest, which is safeguarded under the First
Amendment.97
4. Prior Restraint Limitations
The Supreme Court explained that the term prior restraint is
used "'to describe administrative and judicial orders forbidding cer-
tain communications when issued in advance of the time that such
communications are to occur."' 98 Examples of prior restraint judi-
cial orders include permanent injunctions and temporary re-
straining orders. 99 Generally, content-based prior restraints such as
content-based preliminary injunctions must "contain certain proce-
dural safeguards in order to avoid constituting an invalid prior re-
straint," including a time limitation and prompt judicial review.100
Also, the party seeking the content-based injunction bears the bur-
den of proof in court.' 0 '
Conversely, content-neutral regulations, restrictions, and in-
junctions do not require adherence to the heightened procedural
safeguards imposed on content-based restrictions. 10 2 In Madsen,
the Supreme Court noted that prior restraints are often in the form
discussion of how Bunner distinguished the limited Bartnicki holding from trade
secret law issues, see infra notes 145-53 and accompanying text.
97. See Dooley, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 780 (stating "trade secrets have been recog-
nized as a constitutionally protected intangible property interest"); see also S.F Arts
& Athletics, 483 U.S. at 540 (holding statute protecting USOC's use of term
"Olympic" is "not broader than necessary to protect the legitimate congressional
interest").
98. Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) (quoting MELVILLE
B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 4.03, at 4-14 (1984)) (providing
prior restraint examples).
99. See id. at 550 ("Temporary restraining orders and permanent injunctions
- i.e., court orders that actually forbid speech activities - are classic examples of
prior restraints.").
100. Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 321 (2002) (citing Freedman v.
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965)). The Court in Thomas explained that content-
based restraints must contain the following procedural safeguards to avoid prior
restraint limitations:
(1) any restraint prior to judicial review can be imposed only for a speci-
fied brief period during which the status quo must be maintained; (2)
expeditious judicial review of that decision must be available; and (3) the
censor must bear the burden of going to court to suppress the speech
and must bear the burden of proof once in court.
Id. (citing FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 227 (1990) (citing Freedman, 380
U.S. at 58-60)).
101. See id. (noting censor bears burden of proof in court).
102. See id. at 322 ("We have never required that a content-neutral permit
scheme regulating speech in a public forum adhere to the procedural require-
ments set forth in Freedman.").
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ofjudicial injunctions. 10 3 The Court explained that "not all injunc-
tions that may incidentally affect expression, however, are 'prior re-
straints'.... 104 In Madsen, the Supreme Court refused to apply
prior restraint limitations to a content-neutral permanent injunc-
tion. 105 The Supreme Court has also refused to apply prior re-
straint limitations to content-neutral preliminary injunctions. 10 6
Therefore, content-neutral injunctions based simply on the time,
place, or manner of the prohibited speech are not subject to prior
restraint limitations under the First Amendment. 10 7
IV. LEGAL REASONING IN BUNNER
A. Narrative Analysis
1. Calfornia UTSA and Assumption of Facts
The California Supreme Court began its analysis in Bunner by
briefly discussing the relevant portions of the California UTSA. 10 8
The court explained that the California UTSA specifically provides
103. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 763 n.2 (1994)
("Prior restraints do often take the form of injunctions."); see, e.g., CBS Inc. v. Da-
vis, 510 U.S. 1315, 1317-18 (1994) (holding preliminary injunction enjoining air-
ing of video on 48 Hours constitutes prior restraint); Proctor & Gamble Co. v.
Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 225 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding permanent injunc-
tion prohibiting news organization from publishing information of public concern
violates First Amendment); Bridge C.A.T. Scan Assocs. v. Technicare Corp., 710
F.2d 940, 946-47 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding injunction prohibiting disclosure of trade
secrets lawfully obtained by defendants constitutes prior restraint); Oregon ex rel.
Sports Mgmt. News, Inc. v. Nachtigal, 921 P.2d 1304, 1309-10 (Or. 1996) (holding
statute prohibiting disclosure of trade secrets without prior court approval consti-
tutes prior restraint). For a discussion of how the court in Bunner distinguished
the prior restraint analyses in CBS, Procter & Gamble, Bridge CA. T Scan, and Nachti-
gal, see infra note 159.
104. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 763-64 n.2. The Court explained that the injunction
in Madsen was "issued not because of the content of the petitioners' expression, as
was the case in New York Times Co. and Vance, but because of their prior unlawful
conduct." Id.
105. See id. (noting refusal to "adopt the prior restraint analysis urged by
petitioners").
106. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W.N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 374 n.6
(1997) ("As in Madsen, alternative channels of communication were left open to
the protesters, and 'the injunction was issued not because of the content of [the
protesters'] expression.... but because of their prior unlawful conduct."') (quot-
ing Madsen, 512 U.S. at 764 n.2).
107. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 763-64 n.2 (noting prior restraint analysis does
not apply to content-neutral permanent injunction); see also Schenck, 519 U.S. at
374 n.6 (holding prior restraint analysis does not apply to content-neutral prelimi-
nary injunction).
108. See DVD Copy Control Ass'n, Inc. v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 9-10 (Cal. 2003)
(noting "California has adopted without significant change the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act (UTSA)"). For a detailed discussion of the California UTSA, see supra
notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
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a trade secret owner with the remedy of injunctive relief for misap-
propriation.10 9 The court noted that DVD CCA had initially sought
and obtained an injunction against Bunner and explained that the
court of appeal had assumed the trial court's factual findings with
regard to the likelihood that DVD CCA would prevail on the mer-
its." ° Due to the unique procedural posture of the case, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court similarly accepted the court of appeal's
assumption that DVD CCA was likely to prevail on the merits under
the California UTSA. 111 In doing so, the court hoped to narrow the
issue to whether the trial court's preliminary injunction violated
Bunner's First Amendment free speech protection.' 12
109. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 9 ("California law clearly contemplates the use of
injunctive relief as a remedy for trade secret misappropriation."); see also CAL. Civ.
CODE tit. 5, § 3426.2(a) (Deering 2003) ("Actual or threatened misappropriation
may be enjoined.").
110. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 9-10 (explaining court of appeal assumed trial
court findings "justified 'injunctive relief in the absence of any free speech con-
cerns' under California's trade secret law") (quoting court of appeal's decision).
For a detailed discussion of the trial court's findings and the court of appeal's
assumption of these findings in support of the preliminary injunction, see supra
notes 39-48 and accompanying text.
111. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at at 9 (citing Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 524-
25 (2001) (making factual assumptions based on procedural posture)). The court
in Bunnerstated that "[b]ecause of the unusual procedural posture of this case, we
follow the lead of the Court of Appeal and assume as true the trial court findings
in support of the preliminary injunction." Id. The court made the following fac-
tual assumptions:
Specifically, we accept for purposes of this appeal that DVD CCA is likely
to prevail on its claims that (1) the CSS technology and its master keys
and algorithms are trade secrets; (2) publication of these trade secrets on
the Internet has not destroyed their trade secret status; (3) publication of
DeCSS discloses these trade secrets; (4) the creator of DeCSS acquired
these trade secrets by improper means; and (5) Bunner knew or had rea-
son to know that DeCSS disclosed trade secrets acquired by improper
means. We also assume that DVD CCA will suffer irreparable harm with-
out injunctive relief and that the injunction will cause minimal harm to
Bunner.
Id. at 9-10 (footnote omitted). For a discussion of Justice Moreno's position that
DVD CCA was actually unlikely to prevail on the merits under the California
UTSA, see infta notes 167-81 and accompanying text.
112. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 10 ("Thus, the narrow question before us is
whether the preliminary injunction violates Bunner's right to free speech under
the United States and California Constitutions even though DVD CCA is likely to
prevail on its trade secret claim against Bunner."); see also DVD CCA and Web Site
Operator Both Claim Wins in Cal. Case, supra note 32, at 1 (noting that court's as-
sumption of lower court's findings narrowed First Amendment issue).
[Vol. 11: p. 341
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2. First Amendment Analysis
a. Computer Codes as Protected Human Expression
The California Supreme Court began its free speech analysis of
the preliminary injunction by determining whether computer
codes are subject to scrutiny under the First Amendment. 1 3 Ac-
cording to the court, "'[a]ll ideas having even the slightest redeem-
ing social importance,' including those concerning 'the
advancement of truth, science, morality, and arts' have the full pro-
tection of the First Amendment."'1 4 The court noted that "' [e]ven
dry information, devoid of advocacy, political relevance, or artistic
expression, has been accorded First Amendment protection.' "' 115
Therefore, the court found it difficult to argue that computer codes
are not subject to some level of First Amendment scrutiny." 6
According to the California Supreme Court, computer codes
are subject to First Amendment scrutiny because they are essentially
an expression of human ideas. 117 The court noted that a computer
program is capable of conveying information beyond basic, func-
tional data."18 Therefore, the California Supreme Court concluded
113. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 10 (stating "we must first determine whether re-
strictions on the dissemination of computer codes in the form of DeCSS are sub-
ject to scrutiny under the First Amendment").
114. Id. (citing Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 484 (2000)). For a factual dis-
cussion of Junger, see supra note 63.
115. SeeBunner, 75 P.3d at 10 (citing Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273
F.3d 429, 446 (2d Cir. 2001)). Further, "courts have subjected to First Amendment
scrutiny restrictions on the dissemination of technical scientific information, [cita-
tion] and scientific research, [citation] and attempts to regulate the publication of
instructions [citation]." Id. (quoting Corley, 273 F.3d at 447). For a factual discus-
sion of Corley, see supra note 69.
116. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 10 (citing Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes,
111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), amended by No. 00 Civ. 0277, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 12548, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2001)). The court stated, "[a] s such, 'it
cannot seriously be argued that any form of computer code may be regulated with-
out reference to the First Amendment doctrine."' Id. For a factual review of
Reimerdes, see supra note 67.
117. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 10-11 (describing computer codes as form of ex-
pression). The court noted that although computer codes are commonly written
in highly technical language, they are fundamentally derived from human ideas.
See id. (noting difficultly in understanding computer codes). Essentially, the court
illustrated the highly technical variations computer codes embody when expres-
sing human ideas, stating:
[N]ot everyone can understand each of these forms. Only English speak-
ers will understand English formulations. Principally those familiar with
the particular programming language will understand the source code
expression. And only a relatively small number of skilled programmers
and computer scientists will understand the machine readable object
code. But each form expresses the same idea, albeit different ways.
Id. (quoting Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 326).
118. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 10 (citing Corley, 273 F.3d at 447).
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that " [b] ecause computer code 'is an expressive means for the ex-
change of information and ideas about computer programming,'
'we join the other courts that have concluded that computer code,
and computer programs constructed from code can merit First
Amendment protection." 1 19
b. Determining Content Neutrality
After concluding that computer code and programs merit First
Amendment protection, the court turned to determine what level
of scrutiny to apply to the trial court's injunction banning Bunner
from posting the DeCSS program on his website. 120 The court
noted that "[i] n determining the level of scrutiny, the critical ques-
tion is whether the injunction is content neutral or content
based."'121 The Bunner court explained that content-based injunc-
tions are subject to a level of heightened First Amendment scrutiny,
whereas content-neutral injunctions are subject to the lower level of
scrutiny established in Madsen.122
According to the court, the government's purpose in restrict-
ing speech determines content neutrality. 123 The court explained
that "[o]ur principle inquiry in determining content neutrality is
whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech 'with-
out reference to the content of the regulated speech."' 124 While
content-based injunctions are directly based upon the ideas or views
of the speech they restrict, content-neutral injunctions are unre-
lated to the speech restricted. 125
119. Id. (quoting CorLey, 273 F.3d at 449;Junger, 209 F.3d at 485; United States
v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1126-27 (N.D. Cal. 2002)). For a critical
analysis of treating computer source codes as "speech" for the purposes of First
Amendment analysis, see infra notes 184-90 and accompanying text.
120. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 11 (noting conclusion computer code is expressive
speech "'still leaves for determination the level of scrutiny to be applied in deter-
mining the constitutionality of an injunction prohibiting the dissemination of
computer code").
121. Id. (citing Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 762-64
(1994)). For a factual discussion of Madsen, see supra note 77.
122. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 11 (describing different levels of scrutiny for con-
tent-based and content-neutral injunctions).
123. See id. ("The government's purpose is the controlling consideration
124. Id. (quoting Madsen, 512 U.S. at 763). For a detailed discussion of the
framework used in determining content neutrality, see supra notes 77-84 and ac-
companying text.
125. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 11 (describing differences between content-based
injunctions and content-neutral injunctions). The court emphasized that an in-
junction "'that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed
neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not
others.'" Id.
[ ol. 11: p. 341
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Applying these principles to the facts of the case, the California
Supreme Court concluded that the preliminary injunction prohibit-
ing Bunner from posting DeCSS on his website was content-neu-
tral. 12 6 Turning towards the trial court's factual findings, the
California Supreme Court explained that "[t] he underlying basis
for the injunction is the trial court's holding that Bunner misappro-
priated DVD CCA's property - its trade secrets - in violation of
California's trade secret law." 12 7 The court thus concluded that the
injunction restricted Bunner's posting of DeCSS, not in reaction to
the subject matter of Bunner's message or viewpoint, but rather to
protect DVD CCA's trade secrets. 128
Furthermore, the Bunner court explained that the governmen-
tal purpose behind protection of trade secrets was unrelated to the
content of the trade secrets.' 29 Once again assuming the trial
court's findings that DVD CCA was likely to prevail on the merits
under the California UTSA, the California Supreme Court ex-
plained that the preliminary injunction was directly related to pro-
moting the goals of trade secret law and completely unrelated to
the content of Bunner's posting.130 The court noted that the in-
junction's specific identification of the restricted speech by its con-
tent was irrelevant because an injunction by "'its very nature,
126. See id. (holding trial court's injunction was content-neutral).
127. Id. Specifically, the court explained that "[iln issuing the injunction, the
court therefore relied on the fact that DVD CCA made reasonable efforts to keep
the information secret (§ 3426.1, subd. (d)(2)), and that DVD CCA received a
'competitive advantage over others... by virtue of its exclusive access to the' infor-
mation." Id.
128. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 11 ("[T]he trial court issued the injunction to pro-
tect DVD CCA's statutorily created property interest in information - and not to
suppress the content of Bunner's communications.").
129. See id. at 12 ("'Trade secret law promotes the sharing of knowledge, and
the efficient operation of industry; it permits the individual inventor to reap the
rewards of his labor by contracting with a company large enough to develop it and
exploit it.'") (quoting Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 493)).
130. See id. (noting injunction served underlying goals of trade secret laws).
The court explained:
Assuming, as we do, that the trial court properly applied California's
trade secret law, the preliminary injunction necessarily serves the broader
governmental purpose behind the law. Because the injunction does not
purport to restrict DVD CCA's trade secrets based on their expressive
content, the injunction's restrictions on Bunner's speech "properly are
characterized as incidental to the primary" purpose of California's trade
secret law - which is to promote and reward innovation and technologi-
cal development and maintain commercial ethics.
Id. (quoting S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S.
522, 536 (1987)). For a detailed discussion of the implications of the California
Supreme Court's assumption of the trial court's findings, see infra notes 191-206
and accompanying text.
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applies only to a particular group,"' and "the court hearing the ac-
tion is charged with fashioning a remedy for a specific deprivation,
not with the drafting of a statute addressed to the general pub-
lic."' 13 ' Therefore, the court held that the preliminary injunction
restricting Bunner was content-neutral because it was tailored to
protect DVD CCA's trade secrets regardless of the posting's subject
matter.132
c. Applying the Madsen Intermediate Scrutiny Test
The California Supreme Court held that the preliminary in-
junction at issue in Bunner was content-neutral, and it therefore ap-
plied the Madsen intermediate scrutiny test.133 The Madsen test
requires a court to determine "whether the challenged provisions
of the injunction burden no more speech than necessary to serve a
significant government interest."' 3 4 First, the court explained that
the injunction restricting Bunner properly served a significant gov-
ernmental interest in protecting the inherent property interest of
trade secrets. 13 5 According to the court, the government's protec-
tion of trade secrets promotes technological and scientific develop-
ment.136 In addition, the court noted that trade secret laws also
131. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 12 (citing Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc.,
512 U.S. 753, 762 (1994)). The court explained that "the specific deprivation to
be remedied is the misappropriation of a property interest in information." Id.
"Thus, any injunction remedying this deprivation must refer to the content of that
information in order to identify the property interest to be protected." Id.
132. See id. ("Because the preliminary injunction at issue here does not 'in-
volve government censorship of subject matter or governmental favoritism among
different viewpoints,' it is content neutral and not subject to strict scrutiny.")
(quoting Los Angeles Alliance for Survival v. Los Angeles, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 17
(Cal. 2000)).
133. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 12-13 (describing Madsen First Amendment test).
For a detailed discussion of the Madsen test, see supra notes 85-97 and accompany-
ing text.
134. Bunner, 75 P.3d at 13 (citing Madsen, 512 U.S. at 765). The court noted
that applying the Madsen test requires "'a balance between the governmental inter-
est and the magnitude of the speech restriction.'" Id. (citing S.F. Arts & Athletics,
Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 537 n.16 (1987)). For a fac-
tual discussion of S.F. Arts & Athletics, see supra note 90.
135. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 13 (holding injunction served "significant govern-
ment interests"). The court noted that "trade secret law creates a property right
'defined by the extent to which the owner of the secret protects his interest from
disclosure to others.'" Id. (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1002
(1984)).
136. See id. ("By creating a limited property right in information, trade secret
law 'acts as an incentive for investment in innovation."') (quoting Andrew Becker-
man-Rodau, Prior Restraints and Intellectual Property: The Clash Between Intellectual
Property and the First Amendment From an Economic Perspective, 12 FoRDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 60 (2001)). Furthermore, the court noted that in the
absence of trade secret protection, "organized scientific and technological re-
[Vol. 11: p. 341
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promote and maintain commercial ethical standards, a significant
governmental interest. 13 7
Second, the court held that the preliminary injunction issued
against Bunner "burdens no more speech than necessary to serve
these significant government interests." 13 8 According to the court,
trade secrets derive their inherent property interest from being
kept secret, and thus, injunctions prohibiting their disclosure are
the only effective way to preserve that property interest. 3 9 The
court emphasized that the benefits of the injunction outweighed
the burdens because the trial court's purpose in protecting trade
secrets directly hinged on its ability to enjoin their disclosure
through misappropriation. 140 The court noted that "[t]he First
search could become fragmented, and society, as a whole, would suffer." Id. (quot-
ing Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 486 (1974)). For a detailed
discussion of the impact of trade secret law on scientific development, see supra
note 96.
137. See id. ("Trade secret law also helps maintain 'standards of commercial
ethics ....') (quoting Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 481). The court explained:
By sanctioning the acquisition, use, and disclosure of another's valuable,
proprietary information by improper means, trade secret law minimizes
"the inevitable cost to the basic decency of society when one . . . steals
from another." In doing so, it recognizes that "'good faith and honest,
fair dealing, is the very life and spirit of the commercial world.'"
Bunner, 75 P.3d at 13 (quoting Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 481-82, 487). For a detailed
discussion of the maintenance of commercial ethics through trade secret law, see
supra note 96.
138. Bunner, 75 P.3d at 14. Once again, in reaching the holding the court
assumed that DVD CCA was likely to prevail on the merits under the California
UTSA. See id. (stating "[a]ssuming, as we do, that the trial court properly granted
injunctive relief under California's trade secret law. . ."). For a discussion of Jus-
tice Moreno's position that DVD CCA was unlikely to prevail on the merits in the
concurring decision, see infra notes 167-81 and accompanying text.
139. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 14 ("First, prohibiting the disclosure of trade
secrets acquired by improper means is the only way to preserve the property inter-
est created by trade secret law and its concomitant ability to encourage inven-
tion."). The court noted that "[o]nce the data that constitute a trade secret are
disclosed to others, or others are allowed to use those data, the holder of the trade
secret has lost his property interest in the data." Id. (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Mon-
santo, 467 U.S. 986, 1011 (1984)) (footnote omitted).
140. See id. (describing Madsen balancing test for injunction). The California
Supreme Court explained:
Indeed, the protection of trade secrets and the benefits to research and
development derived from the government's recognition of this property
right depend on the judiciary's power to enjoin disclosures by those who
know or have reason to know of their misappropriation. Bunner proffers,
and we can think of, no less restrictive way of protecting an owner's con-
stitutionally recognized property interest in its trade secrets. Thus, the
preliminary injunction burdens no more speech than necessary to serve
the government's interest in encouraging innovation and development.
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Amendment does not prohibit courts from incidentally enjoining
speech in order to protect a legitimate property right.
'
"
141
Although the California Supreme Court held that injunctive
relief was the only available remedy to protect the property interest
of trade secrets, the court also emphasized that the injunction "up-
holds the standard of commercial ethics maintained by trade secret
law." 142 The Bunner court explained that "[t]he duty to respect
trade secrets imposed 'on any person who acquires the secret with
knowledge that his transferor had improperly acquired it' is derived
from 'the rules governing the receipt of stolen or misappropriated
land or chattels.' ",143 Assuming that Bunner knew or had reason to
know that the DeCSS program was acquired by illegal means, the
court held that the preliminary injunction "merely applies this
venerable standard of commercial ethics to a constitutionally recog-
nized property interest in information." 14
4
d. Distinguishing Bartnicki v. Vopper
The California Supreme Court continued its First Amendment
analysis by distinguishing the Supreme Court's decision in Bartnicki
v. Vopper.14 5 According to Bunner, the Supreme Court in Bartnicki
held that restrictions on speech by persons who know or have rea-
son to know that the speech was obtained illegally violate the First
Amendment. 146 Bunner stressed that the trial court's injunction vi-
olated the First Amendment because it specifically enjoined per-
sons with no connection to the actual misappropriation of the
141. Id. (citing S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm.,
483 U.S. 522, 526, 537-40 (1987)).
142. Id. When assuming the trial court's findings that DVD CCA was likely to
prevail on the merits under the California UTSA, the court assumed that Bunner
"knew or had reason to know that DVD CCA's trade secrets were acquired by im-
proper means ... ." Id. at 18.
143. Bunner, 75 P.3d at 14 (quoting Richard A. Epstein, Privacy, Publication,
and the First Amendment: The Dangers of First Amendment Exceptionalism, 52 STAN. L.
REv. 1003, 1039 (2000)). "Under these rules, a purchaser of stolen property with
actual or constructive notice of the true owner's interests in that property cannot
prevail against that owner." Id.
144. Id. Applying the standard of commercial ethics within the Madsen test,
the court concluded that "[b]ecause a person who knowingly exploits the illegal
acquisition of property owned by another should be in 'no better position than'
the illegal acquirer himself, the injunction burdens no more speech than neces-
sary to serve the government's important interest in maintaining commercial eth-
ics." Id. at 14-15.
145. See id. at 15 (distinguishing Bartnicki); see also Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532
U.S. 514 (2001). For a factual discussion of Bartnicki, see supra note 96.
146. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 14 (noting Bunner's interpretation of Bartnicki).
[Vol. 11: p. 341
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DeCSS source code.14 7 The California Supreme Court distin-
guished this case from Bartnicki, stating that the Supreme Court's
holding was limited to the disclosure of information of public con-
cern.148 Specifically, the court noted that the "United States Su-
preme Court... expressly declined to extend Bartnicki to 'disclosures
of trade secrets or domestic gossip or other information of purely pri-
vate concern."
149
In noting the limitation of the Bartnicki holding, the Bunner
court observed that DVD CCA's trade secrets, embodied in the CSS
technology, simply convey technological information in a purely
private forum. 150 In addition, the court noted that Bunner posted
DeCSS on his website "so Linux users could enjoy and use DVDs
and so others could improve the functional capabilities of DeCSS,"
and not for any public commentary purpose.15 ' In fact, the court
emphasized that "[t] he mere fact that DVD CCA's trade secrets may
have some link to a public issue does not create a legitimate public
interest in their disclosure.' 1 52 After concluding that the First
Amendment interests served by the trial court's injunction against
147. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 15 ("Bunner contends the preliminary injunction
does not satisfy the Madsen test because it enjoins disclosures by those with no
connection to DVD CCA or those people who acquired its trade secrets by im-
proper means.").
148. See id. (noting legal issue in Bartnicki "implicate[d] the core purposes of
the First Amendment because it impose[d] sanctions on the publication of truth-
ful information of public concern") (quoting Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 533) (emphasis
added).
149. Id. (quoting Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 533). The court in Bunner explained
that the Supreme Court in Bartnicki "recognized that the First Amendment inter-
ests served by the disclosure of purely private information like trade secrets are not
as significant as the interests served by the disclosure of information concerning a
matter of public importance." Id.
150. See id. ("DVD CCA's trade secrets in the CSS technology are not publicly
available and convey only technical information about the method used by specific
private entities to protect their intellectual property.")
151. Id. at 15-16 (stating "[Bunner] did not post them to comment on any
public issue or to participate in any public debate"). The court stressed that Bun-
ner's posting of DeCSS on his website was purely private because "only computer
encryption enthusiasts are likely to have an interest in the expressive content -
rather than the uses - of DVD CCA's trade secrets." Id. at 16.
152. Bunner, 75 P.3d at 16. In distinguishing the Supreme Court's decision in
Bartnicki, the California Supreme Court explained that the injunction in Bunner
concerned strictly private matters. See id. The Bunner court stated:
Disclosure of this highly technical information adds nothing to the public
debate over the use of encryption software or the DVD industry's efforts
to limit unauthorized copying of movies on DVD's. And the injunction
does not hamper Bunner's ability to "discuss and debate" these issues as
he has "in the past in both an educational, scientific, philosophical and
political context." Bunner does not explain, and we do not see, how any
speech addressing a matter of public concern is inextricably intertwined
with and somehow necessitates disclosure of DVD CCA's trade secrets
367
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Bunner "are less significant than the First Amendment interests
served by the disclosures at issue in Bartnicki," the California Su-
preme Court held that the injunction against Bunner passed the
Madsen intermediate scrutiny test.153
e. Dismissing Prior Restraint Limitations
The California Supreme Court concluded its First Amendment
analysis by holding that the trial court's preliminary injunction was
not barred by prior restraint limitations. 154 The Bunner court noted
that unlawful prior restraints often come in the form of judicial in-
junctions forbidding specific speech prior to the time the speech
occurs. 15 5 Although the Supreme Court has never expressly de-
fined prior restraint, the Bunner court explained that only content-
based injunctions are subject to prior restraint limitations. 156 Spe-
cifically, the "United States Supreme Court has declined to apply
prior restraint analysis to a permanent injunction and a preliminary
injunction 'issued not because of the content of [the protestors']
expression . . .but because of their prior unlawful conduct.' "157
Applying these standards, the California Supreme Court noted
that the trial court "issued the content-neutral injunction because
of Bunner's 'prior unlawful conduct.' '1 5 8 In addition, the court
briefly distinguished four cases cited by Bunner and held that the
.... The expressive content of these trade secrets therefore does not
substantially relate to a legitimate matter of public concern.
Id. (citations omitted).
153. Id. at 16-17 ("The preliminary injunction issued by the trial court there-
fore burdens no more speech than necessary to serve the significant government
interests promoted by California's trade secret law. Accordingly, it satisfies the
Madsen test[.]").
154. See id. at 17 ("Because the injunction is content neutral and was issued
because of Bunner's prior unlawful conduct, we conclude it is not a prior restraint
and therefore does not violate the First Amendment.").
155. See id. (defining prior restraint). The court explained that "[t]he term
prior restraint is used 'to describe administrative and judicial orders forbidding cer-
tain communications when issued in advance of the time that such communica-
tions are to occur.'" Id. (citing Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550
(1993)). Nonetheless, the court noted that not all injunctions are necessarily prior
restraints. Id. (citing Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 763 n.2
(1994)). For a general discussion of prior restraint analysis, see supra notes 98-107
and accompanying text.
156. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 17 (citing Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316,
321-22 (2002)).
157. See id. at 18 (citing Madsen, 512 U.S. at 763 n.2; Schenck v. Pro-Choice
Network of W.N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 374 n.6 (1997)). For a discussion of the prior
restraint holdings in Madsen and Schenck, see supra notes 103-07 and accompanying
text.
158. Bunner, 75 P.3d at 18 ("Although the court made its finding of prior
unlawful conduct in the context of a preliminary injunction and found only that
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trial court's preliminary injunction was not subject to prior restraint
limitations. 159 Finally, the Bunner court stated that although the
California constitutional provisions covering free speech are sepa-
rate and distinct from the First Amendment, "'[i]n some areas we
have found that the protection afforded by the California liberty of
speech clause is coterminous with that provided by the federal Con-
stitution."" 160 The court further noted that Bunner had failed to
cite any authority suggesting that a different holding would result
DVD CCA was likely to succeed on the merits, this finding is sufficient to render
inapplicable the heavy presumption against prior restraints.").
159. See id. at 18-19 (stating holding with regard to prior restraint issue). Af-
ter reaching concluding that the preliminary injunction did not constitute a prior
restraint, the court briefly distinguished the four cases on which Bunner had re-
lied. See id. (finding Bunner's prior restraint cases inapposite, unpersuasive, and
otherwise distinguishable).
First, the court found CBS Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315 (1994) inapposite. See
id. at 18. The Court in CBS held that a preliminary injunction enjoining the airing
of video on the television show 48 Hours constituted prior restraint. See id. (distin-
guishing CBS); see also CBS, 510 U.S. at 1317-18 (noting holding of case). The
court in Bunner noted that while the CBS Court relied on a lack of clear evidence
that the video footage was acquired by improper means, here the court assumed
that Bunner knew or had reason to know the DeCSS technology was acquired ille-
gally. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 18 (distinguishing CBS).
Second, the court found unpersuasive Bridge C.A. T. Scan Assocs. v. Technicare
Corp., 710 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1983). See id. at 18. The Bridge C.A.T. court held that
an injunction prohibiting the disclosure of trade secrets lawfully obtained by the
defendants constituted unlawful prior restraint. See id. (distinguishing Bridge
C.A.T.); see also Bridge C.A.T, 710 F.3d at 946-47 (noting District Court's holding).
The court noted that unlike Bridge C.A.T., the trial court assumed that Bunner
illegally misappropriated the DeCSS technology. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 18 (distin-
guishing Bridge C.A. T).
Third, the court found inapposite Oregon ex rel. Sports Mgmt. News, Inc. v. Nach-
tiga, 921 P.2d 1304 (Or. 1996). See id. at 18-19. The Nachtigal court held that a
statute prohibiting the disclosure of trade secrets without prior court approval con-
stituted prior restraint. See id. (distinguishing Nachtigal); see also Nachtigal, 921 P.2d
at 92-93 (noting holding of case). While the statute in Nachtigal "required court
approval 'even when there is no allegation that the third-party publisher has vio-
lated the criminal or civil law to possess the information,"' the court in Bunner
assumed Bunner illegally misappropriated the DeCSS technology in violation of
the California UTSA. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 18-19 (quoting Nachtigal, 921 P.2d at
1304, and distinguishing it from facts in Bunner).
Finally, the court distinguished Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78
F.3d 219 (6th Cir. 1996), which held that a pernanent injunction prohibiting a
news organization from publishing information of public concern violated the
First Amendment. See id. at 19 (distinguishing Proctor & Gamble); see also Proctor &
Gamble, 78 F.3d at 227 (setting forth holding). The court in Bunner noted that
while the trial court issued the preliminary injunction after finding DVD CCA was
likely to prevail on the merits under the California UTSA, the court in Proctor &
Gamble issued the injunction without ever determining if the information was in-
deed a trade secret. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 19 (distinguishing Proctor & Gamble).
160. Bunner, 75 P.3d at 19 (quoting Los Angeles Alliance, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 10
n.12); see also CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 2 (providing free speech rights). The court
explained that both the Madsen test as well as the refusal to apply prior restraint
limitations to content-neutral injunctions have been applied within California con-
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under a California constitutional analysis, and therefore concluded
that the preliminary injunction did not violate the California
Constitution. 1 6 1
3. Limitation of Holding and Standard of Review on Remand
After concluding its First Amendment analysis, the California
Supreme Court expressly limited its holding on the basis of its di-
rect assumption that the plaintiff was likely to prevail on the mer-
its.1 62 The court noted that on remand the court of appeal should
test the validity of the court's basic assumption of these facts. 163 On
remand, the Bunner court explained that "'any factual findings sub-
sumed' in the trade secret misappropriation determination 'are
subject to constitutional fact review.' " 164 The court explained that
if the court of appeal holds that the preliminary injunction was im-
proper under the California UTSA, then the trial court abused its
discretion. 165 If the trial court properly assumed DVD CCA was
likely to prevail on the merits under the California UTSA, then the
injunction should be upheld. 166
stitutional analysis. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 19 (noting Madsen and prior restraint
limitations applied to California Constitution).
161. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 19 ("Bunner cites, and we have found, nothing to
suggest that our analysis of the constitutionality of the injunction under Califor-
nia's free speech clause would yield a different result from our analysis under the
First Amendment in this context.").
162. See id. ("We merely hold that the preliminary injunction does not violate
the free speech clauses of the United States and California Constitutions, assuming
the trial court properly issued the injunction under California's trade secret law.").
163. See id. (stating "the Court of Appeal should determine the validity of this
assumption"). Essentially, "[w]hile rejecting Bunner's First Amendment claims,
the Supreme Court sent the case back to the Court of Appeal with specific instruc-
tions to re-examine the question of whether DeCSS was still a legitimate secret at
the time Bunner published it." Paul Sweeting, Studios' DiSc Break, DAILY VARIETY,
Aug. 26, 2003, at 17.
164. Bunner, 75 P.3d at 20 (specifying standard of review) (quoting Rankin v.
McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 385 n.8 (1987)). Under this standard of review, the
court explained that "[o]n remand, the Court of Appeal must therefore make an
independent examination of the entire record, and determine whether the evi-
dence in the record supports the factual findings necessary to establish that the
preliminary injunction was warranted under California's trade secret law." Id. (ci-
tations omitted).
165. See id. ("If, after this examination, the court finds the injunction im-
proper under California's trade secret law, then it should find that the trial court
abused its discretion.").
166. See id. (noting court of appeal should uphold injunction if proper under
California trade secret law); see also DVD CCA and Web Site Operator Both Claim Wins
in Cal. Case, supra note 32, at 2 ("The court remanded the case to the appellate
court to determine the validity of that assumption. It ordered the lower court to
review the entire record to determine whether the injunction was warranted.").
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4. Justice Moreno's Concurrence
Although Justice Moreno concurred with the majority opinion
in Bunner, Justice Moreno stressed that DVD CCA was actually un-
likely to prevail on the merits under the California UTSA. 167 Justice
Moreno began by noting that when balancing First Amendment
free speech rights with trade secret protection, the party seeking
the injunction has the burden of providing sufficient evidence
before the injunction can be granted. 168 Justice Moreno further
noted the majority's "recogni[tion] that a preliminary injunction
against the disclosure of an alleged trade secret without sufficient
evidentiary support is an unlawful prior restraint. ' 169 Although the
majority assumed that DVD CCA was likely to prevail on the merits,
Justice Moreno emphasized that an independent review of the facts
demonstrated that DVD CCA was actually unlikely to prevail on the
merits under the California UTSA.170
Justice Moreno explained the general rule regarding trade
secrets: "once the secret is out, the rest of the world may well have a
167. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 21 (Moreno, J., concurring) ("I concur in the ma-
jority's narrow holding, which, as I understand it, is that the First Amendment does
not categorically prohibit preliminary injunctions to enjoin the publication of
trade secrets."). Nonetheless, Justice Moreno explained that the "DVD Copy Con-
trol Association's (DVD CCA) trade secret claim against Bunner is patently without
merit. . .. ." Id.
168. See id. at 24. The court explained:
how should a court balance First Amendment protections with an alleged
trade secret holder's property rights when asked to issue a preliminary
injunction against publication... [t]he answer lies in requiring the plain-
tiff to make a sufficient evidentiary showing before the injunction is
granted.
Id. See also DVD CCA and Web Site Operator Both Claim Wins in Cal. Case, supra note
32, at 2 ("To balance free speech protections against an alleged trade secret
holder's property rights, Uustice] Moreno said, a court asked to issue an injunc-
tion should make the plaintiff produce enough evidence up front to actually estab-
lish a likelihood of prevailing on the merits and that the balance of harms was in
his favor.").
169. Bunner, 75 P.3d at 24 (Moreno, J., concurring). Justice Moreno ex-
plained that when the majority distinguished the prior restraint limitations in
Bridge C.A. T. and CBS, the court relied heavily on the assumption that Bunner had
misappropriated the DeCSS trade secrets under the California UTSA. See id. (not-
ing majority distinguishing Bridge C.A.T. and CBS). Justice Moreno stated that
"[i]mplicit in these statements is the assumption that a preliminary injunction of a
trade secret publication without the requisite evidence in support would be unlaw-
ful prior restraint." Id. Therefore, Justice Moreno summarized that "a preliminary
injunction on speech issued without a credible determination that plaintiff will
prevail on the merits is a quintessential case of suppressing speech before an ade-
quate determination that it is unprotected by the First Amendment and would
therefore be an unlawful prior restraint." Id. at 26 (citation omitted).
170. See id. at 26 ("Undertaking independent review, I conclude, as a matter
of law, that there is no likelihood that the DVD CCA would prevail on the
merits.").
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right to copy it at will; but this should not protect the misap-
propriator or his privies." 171 Justice Moreno stressed, however, that
"DeCSS was not demonstrably secret in this case when Bunner re-
published it, and Bunner was neither alleged to be the original
misappropriator nor to be in privity with any such misappro-
priators." 172
Justice Moreno noted that Bunner initially acquired the DeCSS
program by downloading the software from an Internet site.' 7 3 Al-
though neither the date of Bunner's initial posting of DeCSS on his
website nor the widespread availability of DeCSS on the Internet
were clear, Justice Moreno noted that DVD CCA claimed that as of
December 1999, at least 118 websites either contained or linked
viewers to sites containing the DeCSS source code. 17 4 In addition,
Justice Moreno pointed out that courts generally hold "a party not
involved in the initial misappropriation of a trade secret cannot be
prosecuted under trade secret law for downloading and republish-
ing proprietary information posted on the Internet, primarily be-
cause the information is in the public domain and is no longer
secret."
175
171. Id; see also Free Speech Rights of Website Operator Were Not Violated by Prelimi-
nary Injunction Barring Posting of DeCSS Software, California Supreme Court Holds in
Trade Secrets Case Filed by DVD Copyright Control Association; But Case is Remanded for
Further Review of Whether DeCSS was a "Trade Secret," ENT. L. RP., Aug. 2003, at 6
(listing general rule regarding trade secret public disclosure).
172. Bunner, 75 P.3d at 26 (Moreno,J., concurring); see also DVD CCA and Web
Site Operator Both Claim Wins in Cal. Case, supra note 32, at 2 (asserting Justice
Moreno's opinion that Bunner was not connected to original misappropriator).
According to one report:
Bunner counters that he simply republished material that was already
widely available to the public. He had nothing to do with creating DeCSS
or "cracking" the DVD copy protection system, he maintains... "Bunner
had no relationship with appellant DVDCCA [sic], nor with those who
allegedly improperly obtained and published the asserted trade secret,"
Bunner maintains. "Bunner had no special access to the asserted trade
secret; it was equally accessible to millions of people around the world.
As regrettable as it may be, the trade secret is no longer secret. The pre-
liminary injunction cannot undo this result."
Calif. Supreme Court Hears Arguments in DVD Decryption Case, supra note 43, at 11-12.
173. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 27 (Moreno, J., concurring) (noting Bunner
"learned of DeCSS from a computer discussion group and downloaded it from a
Web site on the Internet").
174. See id. ("[A]t the time the complaint against Bunner and others was filed
in December 1999, approximately two months after the initial posting, at least 118
Web sites had been identified that either contained proprietary information re-
lated to CSS or provided links to other Web sites with such information.").
175. Id. Justice Moreno continued, explaining that "[t]his conclusion is also
consistent with the principle that the First Amendment generally prohibits limita-
tions, absent some extraordinary showing of governmental interest, on the publica-
tion of information already made public." Id.
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The trial court held that the trade secret was not lost because
DVD CCA moved quickly to seek the injunction to protect the trade
secret technology. 176 However, as Justice Moreno explained, sec-
tion 3426.1(d) of the California UTSA requires not only a reasona-
ble effort in protecting the secrecy of the information, but also that
the information is not generally known to the public. 177 Justice
Moreno concluded that DVD CCA's diligent efforts to protect trade
secrets through injunctive relief fulfilled only one of the California
UTSA's two requirements. 178 Turning to the second requirement,
Justice Moreno noted that DVD CCA's burden of proof included
establishing that the DeCSS program remained a trade secret de-
spite its availability on the Internet.179 Justice Moreno noted that
not only did DVD CCA fail to meet this burden of proof, the trial
court also failed to make any factual finding that "the information
was still secret when Bunner republished it."1 80 Justice Moreno
thus concluded that because DVD CCA failed to establish the
DeCSS source code posted across the Internet remained secret, the
preliminary injunction was, in fact, an unlawful prior restraint ren-
dering the decision to remand unnecessary.'
8
'
B. Critical Analysis
1. Are Computer Codes Necessarily "Speech?"
By relying on a concrete foundation of legal precedent, the
California Supreme Court specifically held that the trial court's pre-
liminary injunction banning the posting of the DeCSS source code
did not violate the free speech provisions of the First Amend-
ment. 8 2 Discussing the clear precedent set forth in Corley, Junger,
176. See id. (noting trial court's statement that "[p]laintiffs moved expedi-
tiously, reasonably and responsibly to protect their proprietary information as soon
as they discovered it had been disclosed by investigating, sending cease and desist
letters all over the world and then filing suit against those who refused within two
months of the disclosure.").
177. See id. (explaining two secrecy factors necessary in defining trade
secrets). For a complete discussion of the California UTSA, see supra notes 50-57
and accompanying text.
178. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 28 (Moreno, J., concurring) ("In order to claim
the existence of the trade secret, both conditions must be present.").
179. See id. (noting "a plaintiff carries the burden of showing that the trade
secret remains a secret despite the Internet posting").
180. Id. Justice Moreno noted that rather than make a particularized finding
that the DeCSS information was secret when Bunner published it, the trial court
had instead simply treated "the 20 or so defendants as a class and ma[de] general
statements that these defendants had published secret information." Id.
181. See id. at 28-29 (stating Justice Moreno's concurrence holding).
182. See id. at 20 (noting limited First Amendment holding of case); see also
Sweeting, supra note 163, at 4 ("The California Supreme Court handed Hollywood
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and Reimerdes, the Bunner court quickly determined that the DeCSS
program was protected speech under the First Amendment because
computer codes and programs are fundamentally a means of ex-
pressing human ideas.18 3 Nonetheless, Professor Ron Dixon has
criticized the reasoning in Corley and Junger, explaining that com-
puter source code "might better be classified as 'artificial speech"'
for purposes of First Amendment scrutiny.'8 4
According to Professor Dixon, although computer source code
resembles natural language, courts may have taken this resem-
blance too far.185 Professor Dixon notes that source code is funda-
mentally different from natural language because it becomes
directly related to the object it represents, rather than simply con-
veying an expression to humans.18 6 Furthermore, Professor Dixon
studios a major victory Monday as it overturned a lower court ruling and declared
that the First Amendment does not allow a publisher to disseminate private trade
secrets.").
183. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 10-11 ("'As computer code ... is a means of ex-
pressing ideas, the First Amendment must be considered before its dissemination
may be prohibited or regulated .... ') (quoting Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 327);
see also Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 449 (2d Cir. 2001)
(announcing "we join the other courts that have concluded that computer code,
and computer programs constructed from code can merit First Amendment pro-
tection"); Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 485 (6th Cir. 2000) ("Because computer
source code is an expressive means for the exchange of information and ideas
about computer programming, we hold that it is protected by the First Amend-
ment."); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 327
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("As computer code - whether source or object - is a means of
expressing ideas, the First Amendment must be considered before its dissemina-
tion may be prohibited or regulated."), amended by No. 00 Civ. 0277, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12548, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2001). For a complete discussion of how
computer code and programs are offered First Amendment protection, see supra
notes 58-76 and accompanying text.
184. See Dixon, supra note 14, at 73 ("By classifying the source code of tech-
nology and science as a unique type of 'speech,' courts might begin to more care-
fully assess how source code should fit within our First Amendment
jurisprudence."). Although Professor Dixon proposes a new definition for describ-
ing source code as "artificial speech," he agrees that there are circumstances when
source code should be subject to protection under First Amendment scrutiny:
Although I am urging that a new category of speech be used to meaning-
fully assess what it is about source code that might render it protectable
speech, the use of the term artificial speech is not meant to imply that
source code is, in my view, outside the scope of the First Amendment.
Indeed, it seems apparent that there are clear circumstances when source
code should be subject to protection under the First Amendment; what is
less apparent is whether courts have adopted a meaningful test to render
their assessment.
Id. (footnote omitted).
185. See id. at 76 ("Source code resembles natural language because it is
written in computer language, some of which closely approximates natural lan-
guage.") (footnotes omitted).
186. See id. ("[O]n the level of abstractions from high level computer lan-
guage toward machine code, source code seemingly becomes fundamentally differ-
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noted that although a computer programmer can write source code
for the purpose of conveying a specific message to other humans
through a computer program, "It] he very process of reverse engi-
neering object code into some form of source code dislodges any
argument that human action is necessary to produce some forms of
source code."18 7 Reverse engineering allows a user to utilize spe-
cialized programs which mimic the original process of developing
the underlying software.188 In so doing, the reverse engineering
program, rather than the user, copies the underlying software to
yield the source code. 8 9 Therefore, Dixon has posited that source
code should be dubbed "artificial speech" for purposes of First
Amendment scrutiny because there may be no way to ensure that a
particular source code was written by humans for the purpose of
expressing information to others. 190
2. Is DeCSS Software Still a Trade Secret?
As opposed to Professor Dixon's view, the California Supreme
Court relied on the precedent set forth by Corley, Junger, and
Reimerdes, holding that DeCSS source code was protectable speech
ent from natural language by assuming a direct relationship with the object it
represents rather than the meaning upon which is imposed for the purpose of
conveying content to humans.").
187. Id. at 83. Professor Dixon explains:
There is no valid argument that source code is inherently more like
"speech" than object code, machine code or any other label. Rather, the
point is that the code used by the programmer to develop software and to
express something about the code's content for the purpose of communi-
cating that expression warrants some degree of protection under the First
Amendment regardless of the label that is affixed to it.
Id. at 1 83 n.195.
188. See id. at 29. "Often, reverse engineering requires an end-user to use a
software tool that reverses the process of software development to yield the source
code." Id. (explaining that reverse engineering process, used in this manner, is
often referred to as "decompiliation").
189. See Dixon, supra note 14, at 29 (describing process of reverse engineer-
ing to yield computer source codes).
190. See id. at 83 (concluding source codes should be called artificial speech
for purposes of First Amendment scrutiny). Professor Dixon further stated:
Hence, there may be no way to ensure that source code in any particular
endeavor was produced by an individual, much less to show that the
source code at issue was produced to convey information to a human
rather than merely to instruct a machine. Consequently, it seems hardly
noteworthy to conclude, as a general matter, that source code is speech.
Instead, the logically coherent argument might be to say that source code
is artificial speech that may be protectable under the First Amendment as
an expressive activity.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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under the First Amendment. 19' The Bunner court also held that the
injunction was subject to the lower scrutiny standard because it was
content-neutral. 192 Applying the Madsen test to the injunction at
issue, the governmental interests underlying the protection of trade
secrets outweighed the burdens placed upon Bunner and other
website operators. 193 The California Supreme Court, however, spe-
cifically limited its First Amendment holding on its predicate as-
sumption that DVD CCA was likely to prevail on the merits under
the California UTSA.19 4
191. See DVD Copy Control Ass'n, Inc. v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 10-11 (Cal. 2003)
("'As computer code ... is a means of expressing ideas, the First Amendment must
be considered before its dissemination may be prohibited or regulated.'") (quot-
ing Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 327).
192. See id. at 12 ("Because the preliminary injunction at issue here does not
'involve government, censorship of subject matter or governmental favoritism
among different viewpoints,' it is content neutral and not subject to strict scru-
tiny.") (quoting Los Angeles Alliance v. Los Angeles, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 1, 17 (Cal.
2000)); see alsoJulie Hilden, California's Supreme Court and the D VD Encryption-Crack-
ing Code, at http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/09/04/findlaw.analysis.hilden.dvd/
index.html (Sept. 4, 2003) ("The First Amendment is primarily concerned with
.content based' laws (which target particular ideas), not 'content neutral' ones
(which do not). And while the injunction targeted Bunner's DeCSS code posting,
it did not do so because of its content."). For a discussion of determining content
neutrality, see supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
193. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 17 ("The preliminary injunction issued by the trial
court therefore burdens no more speech than necessary to serve the significant
government interests promoted by California's trade secret law."); see also Hilden,
supra note 192 (reporting California Supreme Court's application of Madsen test).
Hilden stated:
Therefore, the California Supreme Court held that the injunction and
the relevant law were content-neutral. And once it did so, its decision was
a foregone conclusion. When it looked to the state interests behind trade
secrets law, the court judged them to be strong. Powerful interests in
protecting property justify the law, and thus the injunction - and espe-
cially given the low standard of review, only an egregious free speech vio-
lation could overcome them.
Hilden, supra note 192. For a detailed discussion of the California Supreme
Court's application of the Madsen test, see supra notes 133-44 and accompanying
text.
194. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 17 ("Because. we assume for purposes of this appeal
that the injunction is justified under California's trade secret law, we also assume
that this provision of the injunction is necessary to protect DVD CCA's property
interest in the misappropriated trade secrets."). Explaining the unusual tactic be-
hind attacking the DeCSS posting under the California UTSA, Hilden elaborated
on the California Supreme Court's factual assumptions:
The tactic of invoking trade secret law in this context is ingenious. But
it's also a bit weird. Just because DeCSS decrypts CSS, doesn't mean it
must incorporate CSS's trade secrets. (After all, a can opener doesn't
resemble the can it pries open.) And how secret were these supposed
secrets, anyway, if reverse engineering could reveal them?
However, the California Supreme Court did not address any of this
weirdness. Rather, it assumed that, as the trial court found, DVD CCA
will indeed be likely to be able to prove a trade secrets violation. Only
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Justice Moreno offers a strong argument opposing the validity
of that assumption and the resulting decision to remand the case in
his concurring opinion. 95 According to Justice Moreno, the
DeCSS source code was no longer a trade secret at the time Bunner
posted it on his website because it was widely available on numerous
other Internet websites. 196 The widespread availability of the
DeCSS program seems to indicate that the majority may have inac-
curately assumed that DeCSS was still a trade secret. 197 Moreover,
Justice Moreno noted that DVD CCA never alleged that Bunner was
the original misappropriator or that Bunner was in contact with
parties to the original misappropriation.1 98 Justice Moreno stressed
that "a party not involved in the initial misappropriation of a trade
secret cannot be prosecuted under trade secret law for download-
ing and republishing proprietary information posted on the In-
ternet, primarily because the information is in the public domain
and is no longer secret."' 99 Thus, Justice Moreno may have cor-
rectly concluded that the preliminary injunction was an unlawful
time, evidence, and further trial court proceedings will show if this is ac-
tually true. In short, the trade secrets battle over DeCSS not only has not
been lost - it was never even fought.
Hilden, supra note 192.
195. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 28 (Moreno, J., concurring) (holding "DVD CCA
has failed to establish that the information Bunner republished was still secret at
the time he republished it on his Web site"). For a detailed discussion of Justice
Moreno's concurring opinion, see supra notes 167-81 and accompanying text.
196. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 27 (noting DVD CCA's attorney declared 118 web-
sites had been identified that, at the time the complaint was filed, "either con-
tained proprietary information related to CSS or provided links to other Web sites
with such information").
197. See Calif. Supreme Court Hears Arguments in DVD Decryption Case, supra note
43, at 11-12 ("Bunner had no special access to the asserted trade secret; it was
equally accessible to millions of people around the world. As regrettable as it may
be, the trade secret is no longer secret."). Cindy Cohen, the Legal Director of the
Electronic Frontier Foundation, stated "'DeCSS is obviously not a trade secret
since it's available on thousands of Web sites, T-shirts, neckties and other media
worldwide.'" Sweeting, supra note 163, at 17. Nonetheless, Robert Sugarman,
DVD CCA's lead counsel, explained that "'[w] hen we go back to the Court of
Appeal to actually litigate the (trade secret) issue, we believe that we will be able to
establish that the trial court acted properly and had sufficient evidence to issue
[the] injunction."' Id.
198. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 26 (Moreno, J., concurring) ("DeCSS was not de-
monstrably secret in this case when Bunner republished it, and Bunner was
neither alleged to be the original misappropriator nor to be in privity with any
such misappropriators.").
199. Id. at 27. Justice Moreno noted that DVD CCA had the burden of proof
to demonstrate that the DeCSS program was still fundamentally secret. See id. (ex-
plaining plaintiff has burden of proof). Without any factual evidence illustrating
that DeCSS was still a secret, Justice Moreno stated that DVD CCA failed to meet
that burden. See id. at 27-28 (stating "DVD CCA cannot sustain its burden of dem-
onstrating a likelihood of prevailing on the merits").
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prior restraint and that the remand to the court of appeal was an
"unnecessary delay in resolving this litigation" that "can only fur-
ther burden speech protected by the First Amendment."
200
The widespread availability of DeCSS on the Internet at the
time of Bunner's posting makes it difficult to understand why the
majority assumed that DVD CCA's encryption technology was still
secret. 20 1 The Internet allows "tens of millions of people to com-
municate with one another and to access vast amounts of informa-
tion from around the world."20 2 DVD CCA specifically admitted
that "at the time the complaint against Bunner and others was filed
in December 1999, approximately two months after the initial post-
ing, at least 118 Web sites had been identified that either contained
proprietary information related to CSS or provided links to other
Web sites with such information. '" 20 3 Each of the 118 identified
websites contained information that was freely available for public
viewing on the Internet.204
Therefore, DeCSS was widely available to anyone with a com-
puter and an Internet connection, making the argument that the
technology was still a trade secret difficult to swallow. 20 5 Despite
the obvious widespread availability of DeCSS source code, the ma-
jority remanded the case to the court of appeal to "determine
whether the evidence in the record supports the factual findings
necessary to establish that the preliminary injunction was warranted
under California's trade secret law."206
200. Id. at 26. Internet lawyerJames Tyre agreed with Justice Moreno, declar-
ing "'[t] he remand serves only to delay and to add to the cost of resolution of an
extremely important issue regarding computers, reverse engineering and the In-
ternet.'" DVD CCA and Web Site Operator Both Claim Wins in Cal. Case, supra note 32,
at 2.
201. See Calif. Supreme Court Hears Arguments in DVD Decryption Case, supra note
43, at 11 (noting availability of DeCSS technology on Internet).
202. Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 58 P.3d 2, 4 (Cal. 2002) (quoting Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849-50 (1997)).
203. Bunner, 75 P.3d at 27 (Moreno, J., concurring) (addressing extent of
DeCSS across Internet).
204. See Pavlovich, 58 P.3d at 5 ("If a Web page is freely accessible, then any-
one with access to a computer connected to the Internet may view that page.").
205. See id. (describing prolific growth of Internet); see also See Calif. Supreme
Court Hears Arguments in DVD Decryption Case, supra note 43, at 11 (noting availabil-
ity of DeCSS across Internet); Sweeting, supra note 163, at 4 (illustrating criticism
of court's trade secret assumption).
206. Bunner, 75 P.3d at 20 (noting majority decision to remand) (citation
omitted).
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V. IMPACT
Prior to the California Supreme Court's decision in Bunner,
critics argued that the court of appeal decision would have an ex-
tremely harmful effect on the protection of trade secrets within the
entertainment industry.20 7 Critics explained that the court of ap-
peal decision was akin to a "burglary tool" that would impede the
development of future DVD technology.208 In fact, DVD CCA's suit
against Bunner "is among hundreds the entertainment industry has
brought to stop the program's spread," which DVD CCA claims has
led to more than $3 billion in lost sales due to illegal DVD piracy.209
Prior to Bunner decision, the California Supreme Court was
flooded with more than forty-two amicus briefs arguing for reversal
on behalf of the entertainment industry and other American corpo-
rate interests.2 10 Although the amicus briefs submitted by corpora-
tions such as Coca-Cola Co., the Motion Picture Association of
America ("MPAA"), and the National Football League are com-
monplace among major court decisions, the "sheer volume and
207. See Lafferty, supra note 48, at 4 ("Beyond DVD encryption, the ruling has
additional implications for the entertainment industry, which has frequent trade
secret issues."). After the court of appeal's ruling, Jeffrey Kessler, counsel for DVD
CCA, stated "the ruling makes it impossible for companies to prevent the theft of
trade secrets." Id. Furthermore:
"This case holds that the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act is uncon-
stitutional to the extent that it allows preliminary relief," Kessler said.
"The whole point of the UTSA is if you have a trade secret and someone
steals [it], you can get an injunction and prevent it from being spread.
Because once it's spread, it has no value."
Id.
208. See Sweeting, supra note 48, at 10 ("The Court of Appeal's ruling was a
significant setback for the studios and DVD-CCA, who hoped to use California's
strict trade secret laws to protect CSS as well as any future encryption system the
studios may use, such as on next-generation high-definition DVDs."). According to
California Attorney General Bill Lockyer, "'[c] omputer hackers can't distribute
private property,' . . . [w] hatever speech elements DeCSS contains, it also includes
'a degree of functionality' that makes it more like a burglary tool than speech.. .
Id. at 23.
209. California; DVD Group Seeks Reversal of Ruling on Decoding Tool; Industry
argues posting of decryption program should not be protected by the 1st Amendment, supra
note 29, at 2. Although DVD CCA claims movie companies lose more than $3
billion due to movie piracy, "[c]onsumers, meanwhile, will spend as much as $15.4
billion on digital video discs this year." Id. According to California Attorney Gen-
eral Bill Lockyer, "using the Internet to disseminate information was like using
,the loudest megaphone on the planet."' Id.
210. See McKee, supra note 29, at A10 ("The California Supreme Court... has
been flooded with amicus briefs on behalf of 42 companies or organizations -
with most taking industry's side."). Most of the businesses submitting amicus briefs
were stunned by the court of appeal decision, fearing that the ruling would "lead
to rampant trade secret theft by making it nearly impossible to block the distribu-
tion of malicious software programs." Id.
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powerhouse nature of those filed in the DVD cases are notewor-
thy."211 In addition to the contributions by these corporations and
organizations, California Attorney General Bill Lockyer submitted
an amicus brief in support of DVD CCA.212 Lockyer argued to the
California Supreme Court that a reversal of the court of appeal's
holding was vital to protect the development of trade secrets, future
investment and creativity within the technology industry, and the
common standards of commercial ethics.2
13
Despite the emphasis Lockyer and the numerous corporations
placed on the pending California Supreme Court decision, its im-
mediate impact upon the technological sector is debatable. 214 At-
torneys and supporters of DVD CCA claimed a key victory for the
protection of trade secrets, respectfully disagreeing with Justice
Moreno's conclusion that DVD CCA was actually unlikely to prevail
on the merits under the California UTSA.21 5 In contrast, some sup-
porters of Andrew Bunner have downplayed the decision, stating
211. Id. Richard Epstein, a University of Chicago law professor, submitted an
amicus brief on behalf of Coke, Microsoft Corp., Ford Motor Co., The Boeing Co.,
Sears, Roebuck & Co., Procter & Gamble Co., AOL Time Warner Inc., BellSouth
Corp., and the National Association of Manufacturers. Id. Professor Epstein stated
that if the California Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal decision, "'busi-
nesses will no longer be able to rely on California courts to preserve a wide range
of trade secrets, from customer lists to blueprints to industrial know-how - even
the secret formula for Coca-Cola."' Id.
212. See id. ("Besides Coke and its colleagues, DVD Copy Control is backed by
California Attorney General Bill Lockyer, the Intellectual Property Owners Associa-
tion, and 24 entertainment and sports organizations ranging from the Screen Ac-
tors' Guild to the National Hockey League and the Office of the Commissioner of
Baseball.").
213. See Cal. High Court Tackles Secrets, First Amendment Issues On DeCSS, supra
note 29, at 1 (describing Lockyer's arguments). Specifically:
He argued, as amicus to DVD CCA, that Cal. had a strong interest in: (1)
Protecting trade secrets on new products and processes. (2) Preventing
and combating piracy, whose threat was demonstrated by music file-shar-
ing. (3) Encouraging investment in technology companies. (4) Encour-
aging creative arts and protecting artists' livelihoods. (5) Promoting
commercial ethics. All Cal[ifornia] technology is "at risk to the destruc-
tive work of hackers and misappropriation by competitors or others if the
[secrets] rule is relaxed," Lockyer said.
Id.
214. See DVD CCA and Web Site Operator Both Claim Wins in Cal. Case, supra note
32, at 2 (illustrating various impact arguments from both sides of case); see also
Hilden, supra note 192 (offering two issues Bunner raises for future); Sweeting,
supra note 163, at 4 (describing arguments concerning precedential value of
decision).
215. See DVD CCA and Web Site Operator Both Claim Wins in Cal. Case, supra note
32, at 2. "[I]t was a win not only for DVD CCA but for all trade secret holders
because it made clear that the First Amendment didn't ban the issuance of a pre-
liminary injunction." Id. at 1 (summarizing comments by Robert Sugarman, coun-
sel for DVD CCA). Sugarman explained DVD CCA's thoughts on the impact of
the California Supreme Court decision:
[Vol. 11: p. 341
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that while the decision will have a very beneficial impact on the
software industry, the precedential value is limited by earlier federal
court decisions. 216 One of the attorneys for Bunner actually stated
that the decision was "good news for Netizens because it requires
courts to consider an individual's free speech rights before barring
publication of publicly available information. '" 21 7
Although some critics claim that the California Supreme Court
decision was predictable, it raised several issues regarding trade
secrets and the prior restraint doctrine for the future. 218 In Bunner,
the California Supreme Court specifically held that the prior re-
straint limitations did not apply because the trial court "issued the
content-neutral injunction because of Bunner's 'prior unlawful
conduct.'"219 The Bunner decision raises future questions relating
to how the doctrine of prior restraint, which generally forbids in-
junctions prohibiting speech before it occurs, will apply to Internet
postings that can change from minute to minute.220 The Bunner
The DVD CCA is "very pleased with the decision," Sugarman said. It up-
holds the right of trade secret owners to protect their secrets through
resort to the courts, he said, and says the First Amendment isn't a bar to
preliminary injunctions in such cases. "We respectfully disagree with
Judge [sic] Moreno's opinion," Sugarman said, and will take the opportu-
nity to litigate that issue in the appeals court. However, he said, the fact
that the high court ruled in DVD CCA's favor on the key issue means the
decision is a "complete victory" for the group.
Id. at 2.
216. See id. (describing views on precedential impact). Jonathan Band, an at-
torney for Morrison & Foerster, explained the "huge irony" of the case:
The case in many case has become "completely irrelevant" to the parties
because of a ruling - by the 2nd U.S. Appeals Court, N.Y. in Universal v.
CorLey - upholding the constitutionality of the Digital Millennium Copy-
right Act and finding that DeCSS violates it, Band said. That makes the
Cal[ifornia] decision a "side show," he said.
On the other hand, Band said, the Cal[ifornia] Court of Appeals'
[sic] holding that trade secret injunctions violate the First Amendment
had a "potentially huge collateral impact" on the software industry, a
problem the Cal[ifornia] Supreme Court has now resolved. The appel-
late court decision was "very bad for software companies," Band said, and
its reversal is "very good."
Id. at 2-3.
217. Id. at 1 (noting both sides claimed victory after California Supreme
Court decision).
218. See Hilden, supra note 192 ("Though the California Supreme Court's de-
cision was predictable, it did raise two issues that will be very interesting for the
future.").
219. Bunner, 75 P.3d at 18; see also Hilden, supra note 192 (stating "the Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that the prior restraint doctrine didn't apply, for a very
simple reason: The posting of the DeCSS code had already occurred even before
the injunction was issued").
220. See Hilden, supra note 192 (arguing prior restraint doctrine may be out-
dated). Hilden asked, "[w] hat does it mean to have a restraint be 'in advance of
41
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decision also raises key issues regarding reverse engineering, most
importantly, whether it falls under First Amendment protection.
221
Notwithstanding attempts to downplay the precedential value
of the California Supreme Court's decision in Bunner, the case of-
fers a systematic application of First Amendment free speech princi-
ples to highly sophisticated computer software posted on the
Internet.222 The Bunner court's reversal of the court of appeal deci-
sion helped maintain trade secret protection by permitting injunc-
tive relief against misappropriation. 223 The remedy of injunctive
relief is necessary to encourage future development not only within
the computer software industry, but within all other industries rely-
ing on proprietary information. 224 Although the decision to re-
mand the case may seem like a waste of time and tax dollars to
some, the specific injunctive relief necessary to protect DVD CCA's
trade secrets from widespread dissemination across the Internet
rests within the hands of the California court of appeal.
Nick Washburn
publication,' when publication on the Internet is so much less irrevocable than in
a newspaper or magazine?" Id. Hilden noted, "[a] posting can be posted, de-
posted, and re-posted in minutes." Id.
221. See id. (explaining "reverse engineering, very roughly, is figuring out how
to engineer something by simply examining it"). Hilden argues that reverse engi-
neering may also be protected by the First Amendment because "it is plainly a
creative process, and one that spurs innovation." Id. For a detailed description of
the process of reverse engineering, see supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
222. See Bunner, 75 P.3d at 6-20 (applying First Amendment scrutiny to DeCSS
source code postings).
223. See id. at 9 (noting California UTSA "clearly contemplates the use of in-
junctive relief as a remedy for trade secret misappropriation").
224. See Hilden, supra note 192 (highlighting impact of decision). Hilden ex-
plained the impact of the Bunner decision:
Why were the stakes so high? Because if the court had ruled the other
way - which was very unlikely - trade secret protection on the Internet,
which is already embattled . . .would have entirely disappeared. Trade
secrets would hardly be secret in any meaningful sense anymore, as they
would be allowed to remain on the Internet for all the months or years
during which a case is pending.
Moreover, if the court had ruled the other way, copyright protection
on the Internet would also have taken a huge body blow. The more
DeCSS is promulgated, the more users will be enabled to crack movie
encryption codes and view copyrighted movies for free.
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